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This research advances distributed information sharing by equipping nodes (e.g., 
software agents) in a distributed network with (1) partner selection algorithms in 
cooperative environments, and (2) strategies for providing and requesting information in 
competitive environments. In cooperative environments, information providers are 
willing to provide requested information, but information consumers must consider 
uncertainty in the quality of provided information when selecting appropriate information 
providers. In competitive environments, if a self-interested agent can be an information 
consumer and provider at the same time, agents need to determine the best ways to 
request and provide information so that the information acquisition utility can be 
maximized. This research defines a set of metrics for evaluating information acquisition 
utility, and presents a game-theoretic approach for determining the best information 
sharing strategies based on stochastic games. The results show how agents build 
collaborative relationships with appropriate agents and how the information acquisition 
utility is affected by those relationships. 
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“Non-cooperation with evil is as much a duty as is cooperation with good.” 
                                          - Mohandas Gandhi 
 
 
1.1 MOTIVATION AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research presents information sharing strategies among distributed software 
agents to maximize each agent’s information acquisition utility. The information sharing 
strategies enable agents (1) to efficiently select appropriate information providers in 
cooperative environments in the presence of information quality uncertainty, and (2) to 
build collaborative relationships with appropriate agents by adjusting information request 
supply strategies in competitive environments. 
In cooperative environments, agents share a common goal(s) and cooperate with 
each other to pursue the shared goal(s) [Lesser 1999]. Therefore, in cooperative 
information sharing networks, information provider agents are assumed to always 
provide requested information since the information requests are made toward goal 
achievement and information supply helps accomplish the goals. However, the provided 
information may contain uncertainty in its quality, which can cause the degradation of 
information acquisition utility. Therefore, information consumer agents may want to 
select the best information providers (called partners in this research) who can contribute 
the most to their information acquisition utility. On the other hand, in competitive 
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environments, each agent has its own goal(s) [Leyton-Brown 2003]. Therefore, in 
competitive information sharing networks, information provider agents may not provide 
requested information. The supply of information can occur only when the information 
supply benefits information provider agents. The expected benefits for information 
provider agents may include immediate payoffs such as monetary compensation or 
reciprocal information supply in the future. If immediate payoff to information provider 
agents is not granted, the interaction between information consumers and providers needs 
to be repeated for information supply to happen. If the interaction is not repeated, no 
agent will provide information to others because there is no expected future benefit from 
providing information to others by wasting their resources. If interaction is repeated, each 
agent can provide requested information expecting reciprocal future benefit. 
Consequently, each agent needs to determine its strategies for requesting information and 
responding to other agents’ requests in a way that each agent’s information acquisition 
utility can be maximized through the repeated interactions.  
In this research, the distributed entities referred to as “agents” may be human or 
software agents. Characteristics of software agents mimic human’s .proactive pursuit of 
goals and therefore offer an ideal modeling paradigm for addressing the challenges in (1) 
selecting the appropriate information providers in cooperative environments, and (2) 
determining information request and supply strategies in competitive environments. An 
agent is an intelligent entity pursuing goals with a certain degree of autonomy in its 
environment. Although a universal agreement on the essential features of agents does not 
exist, the following properties are commonly accepted as key ingredients of agents 
[Jennings, Sycara et al. 1998]. 
 Situated: Agents are deployed in or surrounded by environments. Typical 
examples of environments can include the Internet for information agents, a 
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soccer field for robot soccer, a battlefield for combat agents, an e-market for 
buying or selling agents. In addition to the surrounding world, environments 
also include other agents. 
 Reactive: Agents take sensory inputs from environments and respond to 
fluctuation in environments.  
 Proactive: Agents are goal-oriented or goal-driven, so the actions or decisions 
agents make are not merely responsive but rather they strive toward goal 
achievement. 
 Social: Agents are able to communicate and interact with other agents 
(including humans) to achieve goals, especially when multiple agents populate 
the environments. 
As proposed in Sensible Agent architecture [Barber, Goel et al. 1997; Barber, 
Mckay et al. 2001], the primary tasks for achieving goals can typically be composed of 
sensing the environments, building situational pictures, selecting actions, and taking 
actions to environments, in addition to more complicated tasks such as structuring an 
organization, negotiating with each other, etc. Situational pictures, often called beliefs of 
agents, are built based on the sensory inputs which can be obtained either by direct 
sensing activity of an agent or by communicated data (information) from other agents 
(information providers). Information elements required to build beliefs are referred to as 
information requirements. Decisions on which actions to take are made based on the 
situational pictures. Thus, the goal achievement is affected by how accurately and 
efficiently the situational pictures are built.  
In open and distributed environments where agents can join or leave their 
environments at will and where no central control exists, agents have goals of their own 
which they may not share with other agents, and each agent pursues its own goals in their 
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environments. Agents are attributed to be self-interested when they are interested in 
achieving their own goals. Self-interested agents are competitive with each other because 
they compete for the resources in their shared environments. Even with the existence of 
system-wide global goals shared by all agents in the system, agents can be self-interested 
if the global goals are divided into sub-goals and the sub-goals are allocated to the agents 
as individual agent’s goals.   
Since an agents’ goal achievement is affected by the situational pictures they 
build based on their perception of their environments, enhancing the ability to sense 
environments or to communicate information can help agents pursue their goals. When 
an agent is endowed with a complete sensing ability so that an agent can monitor or 
perceive all environmental changes, communication of information may not be 
indispensable. On the other hand, when an agent is bounded-rational, meaning an agent 
has limited resources and capabilities [Simon 1955], communications with other agents 
are critical to an agent’s goal achievement. The communication of information can be 
assumed to be bidirectional since an agent can either provide information or request 
information. Information exchange or information sharing represents the bidirectional 
flow of information.  
This dissertation aims to provide strategies to agents for sharing information with 
other agents efficiently, so that agents can find the most appropriate information 
providers as well as control the amount of collaborative efforts with other information 
seekers. The information sharing strategies are defined along two dimensions. The first 
dimension of the information sharing strategies is the strategy for requesting necessary 
information in an information consumer role. The information request strategy decides 
from which information providers to request which information elements, both in 
cooperative environments and competitive environments. The other dimension of the 
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information sharing strategies is the strategy for responding to other agents’ requests 
from an information provider role. This strategy determines the degree of collaboration 
with other agents. An agent’s degree of collaboration with other agents adapts to its 
environments based on the agent’s observations about other agents’ behavior.  
The ultimate objective of equipping agents with information sharing strategies is 
to enable agents to efficiently satisfy information requirements so as to maximize their 
own goal achievement in a given situation. The information sharing strategies maximize 
the agent’s goal achievement by both inducing the emergence of collaboration among 
reciprocally complementary agents and by enabling agents as information providers to 
avoid exploitation. Agents are reciprocally complementary if an agent needs a subset of 
available information elements from the other agent, and the other agent needs a subset of 
available information elements from the agent in turn. In other words, collaboration 
emerges when agents can achieve more by sharing information with other agents than by 
operating without any interaction or communication. If agents are designed to respond to 
all requests from others, they can be exploited by selfish agents who try to obtain what 
they need without contributing to other agents. The proposed information sharing 
strategies can prevent the exploitation of information providers from selfish agents or 
selfish consumers.  
The hypothesis of this dissertation can be stated as follows. 
 
The information sharing strategies enable agents to obtain required information 
of high quality by building collaborative relationships with complementary and 
trustworthy agents.  
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The research questions to validate the hypothesis and corresponding challenges 
for each research question are as follows. 
 
Research Question 1 (RQ 1)  Partner Selection 
How do information consumer agents select the most appropriate information providers 
so that information acquisition utility can be maximized?   
 
In cooperative environments, information providers try to respond to information 
consumer agents’ requests. Even if the information delivery is guaranteed to information 
consumer agents, the information acquisition utility can vary depending on the selection 
of information providers in the presence of multiple information providers. The 
uncertainty regarding information acquisition utility can stem from the deficiency of the 
providers in sensing, communication, or computation. The uncertainty can also be caused 
by a provider’s attitude or resources; how much effort providers make in providing the 
information. From an information consumer agent’s perspective, overcoming the 
uncertainties associated with information contributes to the agent’s goal achievement. 
Also, an information consumer agent’s information requirements can change over time 
due to the agent’s level of autonomy or the dynamics of environments. This change in 
information requirements significantly affects the way that information is requested from 
others. This research question addresses the problem of how to incorporate the factors 
influencing information quality and the dynamic change of information requirements into 
a representation of the information acquisition utility, and how to select the providers 
who can maximize the goal achievability by maximizing an agent’s information 
acquisition utility. In order to answer this question, we decompose the problem into the 
following sub-questions. 
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RESEARCH QUESTION 1.1 (RQ 1.1): How can information acquisition utility be 
defined? 
This research question identifies the key factors which can affect the information 
acquisition utility of an agent and provide a formal representation of the factors. 
Then, the information acquisition utility function is defined by combining those 
factors. 
  
RESEARCH QUESTION 1.2 (RQ 1.2): How can information consumer agents find 
the most appropriate partners to maximize the information acquisition utility? 
By considering tradeoffs between the factors of information acquisition utility, 
agents pursue the maximization of the utility function. This research question 
addresses how agents can efficiently select the best information providers and 
investigate the tradeoffs of various selection schemes.  
 
Research Question 2 (RQ 2) – Collaboration among Agents 
How should an agent interact with other agents for sharing information? 
 
The second research question addresses the issues of information sharing in more 
dynamic situations. In contrast to Research Question 1, this research question assumes 
competitive environments. Self-interested agents in the system pursue the maximization 
of their own benefits. The roles each agent can play are also extended by allowing 
consumer and provider roles at the same time. In other words, agents in the system play 
the role of information consumer and information provider at the same time, and try to 
maximize their information acquisition utility by controlling their own information 
request strategy and information supply strategy. When interactions are repeated, agents 
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may need to provide information to others if the cost for providing information to the 
requesters is smaller than expected rewards in the future. This research does not assume 
any synchrony in information requests and delivery. Information requests and 
information delivery are asynchronous, meaning that each agent does not need to make 
decisions regarding information requests and information supply simultaneously. In other 
words, information requests are made whenever an agent needs information elements and 
a decision on information supply is triggered by other agents’ requests, which are also 
made at arbitrary times. The asynchrony enables any two agents (agent 1 and agent 2) to 
be placed in one of the following relationships at any given moment; consumer-provider 
(agent 1 requests, agent 2 responds), provider-consumer (agent 1 responds, agent 2 
requests), consumer/provider-provider/consumer (agent 1 requests and responds, agent 2 
responds and requests simultaneously), and the relationship changes over time 
dynamically. 
In order to provide information strategies that can handle these dynamic 
situations, Research Question 2 is divided into the following sub-questions. 
 
RESEARCH QUESTION 2.1 (RQ 2.1): How should agents request information as 
information consumers? 
In competitive environments, the information providers may respond to other 
agents’ information requests based on their local decision process, thus the 
information delivery may not be guaranteed to information consumer agents. 
Also, the current information requirements are typically dependent on the 
previous responses of the providers because the current information requirements 
are the remainders which were not satisfied in the previous round of interactions 
unless the goal itself has changed. Thus, the information requests have to be made 
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in such a way that maximizes the agent’s expected rewards, accounting for the 
interaction history and future expectation. 
 
RESEARCH QUESTION 2.2 (RQ 2.2): How should agents respond to other agents’ 
requests of information as information providers?  
Even if an agent can provide certain information to requesting agents, the agent 
does not need to waste its resources by helping those agents unless the agent is 
altruistic. On the other hand, if providing information helps a provider’s goal 
achievement, it is a rational behavior to provide requested information, assuming 
the provider is self-interested. Therefore, the dilemma an information provider 
confronts is that if an agent is willing to respond to any requests, the agent can be 
exploited and may end up achieving nothing while if an agent does not respond to 
any requests the agent may not procure necessary information elements from 
other self-interested agents. Therefore, agents need to adaptively control the way 
they respond to other agents’ requests. 
 
RESEARCH QUESTION 2.3 (RQ 2.3): How can the strategies for information 
consumers and information providers be related? 
Since an agent is an information provider and consumer, the strategy as an 
information provider can affect the strategy as an information consumer and vice 
versa. As an example, an agent is likely to make requests to the agents which it 
thinks it has formed collaborative relations with, and the agent’s degree of 
collaboration with those agents can give clues for the request decisions. 
Therefore, agents can benefit from properly coupling both dimensions of the 
information sharing strategies.  
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1.2 APPROACH OVERVIEW 
This section presents the overview of approaches for each research question. 
More details about each approach are presented in Chapters 3 and 4. 
 
1.2.1 Partner Selection 
An information consumer agent has a set of goals and the goals impose a set of 
information elements required to achieve the goals. The information requirements (i.e. a 
set of information elements required by goals) need to be satisfied from other information 
provider agents. An information consumer agent evaluates the information providers and 
selects the information providers which can contribute to the consumer’s rewards.  
Rewards from information acquisition (i.e. information acquisition utility) are 
defined in terms of cost, coverage, and quality, which account for the computational 
burden of information exchange, the amount of information requirements satisfaction, 
and the error in the obtained information respectively. Information acquisition needs to 
be computationally inexpensive. The acquired information needs to contribute to the 
information requirements so that more requirements are satisfied by the acquired 
information. In addition, the information needs to be of high quality, meaning the 
information needs to be accurate and consistent.  
The dilemma for an information consumer is that the highest quality information 
may require the most computational cost, or coverage can sometimes be maximized by 
low quality information. These tradeoffs are compromised by defining a combined 
measure of information acquisition utility. The information consumer agents aim to select 
the information providers who maximize the combined measure of information 
acquisition (i.e., the reward of information acquisition). The process of information 
acquisition from an information consumer agent’s perspective is depicted in Figure 1. 
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The repeated interactions with providers enable agents to update the evaluation of 
information providers, and the selection can be refined over time. Also, the iterative 




Figure 1 Partner Selection 
1.2.2 Collaboration among Agents 
In competitive environments, agents do not usually share their internal states or 
decision-making process with others. Therefore, agents need to model other agents’ 
internal states or decision-making process by observation. This research provides a 
scheme to build the model of other agents’ actions for information sharing, and use the 
model for the decision-making process. In this research, the decision to share 
information, called information sharing strategies, consists of two action sets. The first 
type of decision for information sharing determines from which information providers to 
request which information. Since information providers have choices as to whether to 
respond to the requests and information consumers do not know the providers’ 
information sharing strategy, information consumer agents model the information 
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providers’ information sharing strategy by observing the responses of information 
providers. The second type of decision for information sharing determines the degree of 
collaboration. The degree of collaboration determines how agents respond to other 
agents’ requests. Figure 2 depicts how an agent decides the information sharing strategies 
as a consumer and a provider by observing other agents.  
 
 
Figure 2 Collaboration among Agents 
An agent’s strategy as an information consumer is determined by modeling the 
interaction as a stochastic game. In the stochastic game, each state is modeled as a set of 
information requirements. The available actions as a consumer at a state and providers’ 
corresponding actions decide the next state. For example, with a consumer agent’s initial 
state comprised of information requirements A and B, if a consumer’s action is to request 
information A and B from agent 1 and agent 2 respectively, the next state of the 
consumer agent with providers’ action such that agent 1 responds and agent 2 does not 
respond is information requirement B. Thus, the consumer agent needs to decide from 
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whom to request information B in the next step. A consumer agent calculates the 
sequence of actions such that all the information requirements are obtained, and selects 
the current request actions that maximize the expected rewards. When calculating the 
expected rewards, the probability of transition from one state to another state is 
dependent on the providers’ actual actions, and the probability is modeled from the 
previous history. Also, the quality of the information as trustworthiness is reflected in 
expected rewards.  
An agent’s strategy as an information provider is to determine the degree of 
collaboration with the requesting agents. The degree of collaboration is the probability of 
responding to other agents’ requests. When two agents are in the role of providers with 
each other (i.e., two agents request information from each other), the expected reward 
structure becomes similar to the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) [Axlerod 1984], with a 
continuous action space for each agent. Since the interaction is assumed to be repeated, 
the problem is extended to the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) [Axlerod 1984]. Each 
agent has binary choices in IPD, and Tit-For-Tat (TFT) has been the most powerful 
strategy for accumulating the maximum rewards in IPD. TFT is to start with cooperation 
and do the same action with the opponent from the next interaction.  
The adaptive degree of collaboration proposed in this research also takes a similar 
approach. A consumer agent starts from a high degree of collaboration. The degree of 
collaboration decreases if the interacting agent’s degree of collaboration decreases, while 
the degree of collaboration increases if the interacting agent’s degree of collaboration 
increases. Since the other agents’ degree of collaboration is not known, each agent builds 
a model of the other agents’ degree of collaboration based on history of interaction, and 
uses the model for inferring the other agents’ degree of collaboration. An agent can also 
be in a provider’s role when there is no bidirectional interaction. For example, when 
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agent 1 does not request information from agent 2, agent 2 may request information from 
agent 1. In that case, they are not playing IPD, so continuous variation of TFT is not 
applicable. Thus, if agent 1 does not adjust its degree of collaboration with agent 2, agent 
2 can exploit agent 1 by requesting information from agent 1, because agent 1 does not 
adjust (.i.e., decrease) the degree of collaboration with agent 2, which is not desirable to 
agent 1. This situation is addressed by introducing the decay of the degree of 
collaboration. An agent decays the degree of collaboration if it does not request 
information from particular information provider. 
 
1.3 SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS 
The contribution of this dissertation by answering the research questions and 
validating the hypothesis can be summarized as follows. 
 
 Defining the information acquisition utility based on goal achievement: This 
research provides a model of the information acquisition utility based on each 
agent’s goal achievement. Instead of deploying an incentive-based utility 
model (e.g., [Ioannidis, Ioannidis et al. 2002; Yu and Singh 2003b]), which 
usually involves a monetary transfer mechanism among agents or assumes the 
allocation of payoff from the system, the proposed information acquisition 
utility is determined according to each agent’s needs and the delivery of 
information derived from each agent’s goals. This information acquisition 
utility, defined from each agent’s perspective, not only removes the need for a 
complicated incentive mechanism, but also allows the different implications 
of information exchange from agent to agent based on the agents’ information 
requirements. Thus, this alternative approach provides a more fundamental 
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element for representing goal achievability, especially in distributed multi-
agent systems.  
 
 Providing partner selection schemes in cooperative information sharing 
networks: The proposed partner selection schemes use the proposed 
information acquisition utility as the selection criteria for information 
providers in cooperative environments. In a single provider selection problem, 
a consumer agent may not suffer from the search space explosion and can 
pursue the selection of the optimal combination of information providers. 
Heuristic search techniques are proposed to allow the agents to find the good-
enough solutions for the cases that can cause search space explosion, such as 
the multiple provider selection problems. The heuristic search techniques 
speed up the search by escaping the local optima or plateau quickly and lead a 
consumer agent to “good-enough” partner selection swiftly with a limited 
amount of resources. The fast convergence to the “good-enough” partners also 
improves information acquisition utility in dynamic environments. 
 
 Providing the information sharing strategies for dynamic and asynchronous 
information exchanges: Information exchange is not a synchronous one-shot 
event, but more likely to be asynchronous and continually active. In other 
words, agents request required information if necessary and respond to other 
agents’ requests when other agents actually request information. Also, the 
information requirements can change due to goal change or other dynamics of 
environments. These complexities are dealt with to provide agents with 
information sharing strategies that can maximize agents’ information 
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acquisition utility. As opposed to other research results which mostly focus on 
either the information consumer’s perspective or the information provider’s 
perspective (e.g., [Saha, Sen et al. 2003; Sen, Dutta et al. 2003]), the 
proposed information sharing strategies contemplate both consumer and 
provider roles at the same time.  
 
 Showing the emergence of collaboration among agents and exploitation 
avoidance: As an essential feature of information sharing strategies, this 
dissertation shows how collaborative relations among competitive agents can 
emerge. In addition to complementary relations between agents, this research 
incorporates the trustworthiness of information providers as another factor 
that affects the construction of the relationships. It is also shown how 
collaborative relations can help avoid the exploitation of information 
providers by selfish agents. Finally, as opposed to the explicit agreement-
based collaboration schemes, the emergent nature of the collaborative 
relationships allows the flexibility of constructing new relationships easily in 
the presence of any environmental dynamics.  
 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, related 
work is presented. Chapter 3 provides the approach for the partner selection problem, 
followed by strategies for collaboration among agents in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 presents 
experimental results for each research question. Chapter 6 summarizes and concludes the 
dissertation.   
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This chapter presents previous work related to the research questions: (1) partner 
selection and (2) collaboration among self-interested agents.  
Research on partner selection (often called the connection problem [Davis and 
Smith 1983]) can be further categorized from different perspectives depending on the 
techniques for modeling other agents and interaction styles. The ways agents model other 
agents give criteria for evaluating appropriateness. Once the evaluation metrics for 
partner selection are decided, how the evaluations are used to select appropriate partners 
needs to be decided.  
Research on collaboration among agents is a natural extension of partner 
selection. While the partner selection problem generally assumes unidirectional provider-
consumer relationships and aims to equip information consumers with partner selection 
strategies, collaboration is generally a bidirectional relationship. In cooperative 
environments with globally shared goals, collaboration among agents may imply a team 
formation. On the other hand, in competitive environments with local goals for each 
agent, the collaboration may emerge as a result of agents’ efforts to maximize individual 
payoffs. In other words, agents’ collaboration can emerge if collaborative interactions are 
chosen for higher expected payoffs as a result of the decision-making process.  
In the following sections, previous work in each research question and related 
research are presented and compared to the research presented in this dissertation. 
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2.1 PARTNER SELECTION  
Partner selection is a core capability for agents in distributed networks where 
agents cannot achieve their goals by themselves or where they can do better jobs when 
they can get help from other agents. In other words, partner selection plays an important 
role in filling the deficit of distributed agents. Research on partner selection generally 
proposes various types of evaluation metrics for selecting appropriate partners. The 
evaluation metrics are called trustworthiness, quality of service, etc. Partner selection 
mechanisms can in general be divided into three categories based on the interaction styles 
(note that these three categories are not strictly divided): local decision with local 
modeling, negotiation-based approach (i.e., coalition formation), and middle agents. 
Local decision with local modeling [Nebel 1998; Barber and Park 2004b; Park 
and Barber 2004; Maximilien and Singh 2005; Park and Barber 2005b] takes into account 
the local model about potential partners (i.e., trustworthiness, reputation, quality of 
provided services) and finds the most appropriate partners based on the local model. This 
approach involves the evaluation of service or service providers, and the evaluation is in 
general not a global knowledge. The negotiation-based approach involves explicit peer-
to-peer communication for negotiation. The Contract Net Protocol [Smith 1980; Smith 
and Davis 1981] provides a simple and efficient negotiation mechanism for finding the 
best partners who provide necessary services at the least cost. Research on coalition 
formation among self-interested agents often adopts the negotiation mechanism so that 
agents can figure out who the best candidates are for forming a coalition. Negotiation is 
useful especially when there are no arbiters. Using middle agents [Decker, Sycara et al. 
1997] can also be listed as another type of partner selection mechanism. Brokers or 
matchmakers are often deployed to facilitate the process of connecting service providers 
and service consumers.  
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The selection method in this dissertation can be categorized as local decision by 
modeling agents. However, this method is different from other local decision approaches 
in the way that the quality of service is evaluated based on the contribution to an agent’s 
goal achievement in a dynamic environment. In the following subsections, more details 
about each category of partner selection mechanisms are provided.  
 
2.1.1 Local Decision by Modeling Agents 
In order to select appropriate partners, agents need to know about other agents’ 
degree of appropriateness. Because of the lack of global knowledge about entire systems, 
self-interested agents need to build their own models about other agents and the world. 
These models are constructed either by direct observation or communication with other 
agents. The models for gauging the appropriateness of other agents as partners are usually 
based on the evaluation of information providers in terms of predefined appropriateness.  
Research on the evaluation of information providers has been conducted in the 
context of social control. In social control research, agents need to evaluate other agents 
or the services provided by other agents in order to realize a distributed but secure control 
over the interactions among agents [Rasmusson and Jansson 1996]. Rasmusson and 
Jansson suggest the use of social control as a way to create secure open systems. The 
idea is to let the agents in the system be responsible for the security of the system without 
having a global authority. There has been a significant amount of literature related to 
social control, with trustworthiness research [Alchourron, Gardenfors et al. 1985; Barber 
and Kim 2001; Hyunh 2006] representing the most relevant area for social control.  
Research addressing trust in an agent society provides various perspectives for 
evaluating other agents as well as the methods for identifying the most potentially 
trustworthy partners. However, since the trust research mostly focuses on modeling and 
 20
evaluating the trustworthiness of the agents, research about how the trust models can 
affect goal achievement in a dynamic environment has not been fully explored. This 
dissertation demonstrates how agents can proactively pursue their goals using an 
estimated model of other agents in a dynamic environment, as well as how agents can 
establish collaborative relationships.  
In the information exchange domain, research on belief revision also involves 
how to select appropriate information providers. Belief is in general a situational 
awareness, and research investigating belief revision in multi-agent systems [Alchourron, 
Gardenfors et al. 1985; Shafer and Shenoy 1990; Barber and Kim 2003; Fullam and 
Barber 2004] pursues a similar objective: build the agents’ beliefs accurately and 
efficiently by using all the information provided. In these approaches, the beliefs are 
assigned preferences by epistemic relevance in a symbolic logic [Alchourron, Gardenfors 
et al. 1985], or ordered by credibility in [Shafer and Shenoy 1990] using belief function. 
Also, preferences can be determined by evaluating the information source trustworthiness 
using Bayesian networks [Barber and Kim 2003] or a statistical approach [Fullam and 
Barber 2004]. Exact inference using these approaches is computationally expensive 
[Liberatore 1997; Nebel 1998; Lerner, Segal et al. 2001], so there have been 
approximate inference approaches which reduce the complexity of computation [Cadoli 
and Schaerf 1995; Koller, Lerner et al. 1999; Murphy 1999; Chopra, Parikh et al. 2000]. 
However, those approximate inferences are applicable to the specific belief revision 
algorithm targeted by the respective scheme.  
The partner selection scheme proposed in this research does not consider how the 
belief should be formed, but it can be used before the belief revision process to vet 
information and sources on which the belief revision process relies. Therefore, the 
proposed scheme in this research is independent of the belief revision schemes, while we 
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hypothesize that the research will enhance the efficiency and accuracy of the belief 
revision process by reducing the amount of information as well as increasing the quality 
of information the belief revision process handles, which results in the increase of goal 
achievability. 
Maximilien and Singh [2005] proposed a method for selecting appropriate service 
providers based on quality of service (QoS) among Web services. They distinguish 
interactions of service providers and consumers into three phases: discovery, selection, 
and binding. For the selection phase, they associate nonfunctional attributes such as 
capacity of a service, and response time to represent the quality of services. The quality 
of services can be provided as a reputation and is shared by all agents. With this 
evaluation of service quality, the selection problem can be simplified to picking up the 
most trustworthy services. While this approach provides a practical solution to selecting 
the most trustworthy partners based on the quality of Web services, it lacks the ability of 
handling dynamic changes in service consumers’ requirements. In other words, 
Maximilien and Sigh’s approach can work well for a one-shot interaction or iterated 
interactions for a single service, but it does not consider the case where the current or 
future service requirements are dependent on the previous interactions. In order to 
overcome this limitation, the proposed approach in this dissertation uses expected utility, 
which is based on the behavioral model of service-providing agents as well as the quality 
of services. 
Generally, modeling other agents by observation and making local decision about 
who to work with do not involve a negotiation process that requires an agreement among 
the participating agents. Therefore, local decision by local modeling is adaptive to any 
dynamics in the system. Also, since the decision is made locally, it is relatively simple to 
construct an overlapping relationship. However, because of intrinsic uncertainty from the 
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local model, the accuracy of the local model significantly affects the resulting selection of 
partners. In addition, agents need iterative interactions to gather evidence or to build a 
knowledge base for modeling or evaluating other agents. 
 
2.1.2 Negotiation-based Partner Selection 
Making agreement in agent partnerships with other agents can be accomplished 
through a negotiation process. Because of the clear memberships in collaboration, 
negotiation among agents can give a stable and stationary relationship especially for 
long-term interactions.  
Contract Net Protocol (CNP) [Smith 1980; Smith and Davis 1981; Davis and 
Smith 1983] provides a simple and efficient negotiation mechanism for finding the best 
partners who provide necessary services at the least cost. CNP is a fully automated 
negotiation protocol where each agent can be an initiator or a participant. After an 
initiator sends out a call for proposals, participants bid on that call and the initiator selects 
the best bids while rejecting other bids. This protocol has been adopted in TRACONET 
(Transportation Cooperation Net) [Sandholm and Lesser 1997] for a vehicle routing 
application, and has also been standardized in FIPA (Foundation for Intelligent Physical 
Agents) as an interaction protocol among agents. Although CNP provides a relatively 
simple mechanism for partner selection, it can still be computationally expensive in 
large-scale systems because of the message complexity. Also, CNP may be vulnerable to 
the situation where commitment to the contract is not guaranteed. In other words, agents 
need to be cooperative for CNP to work.  
The Adaptive Decision Making Framework (ADMF) [Barber and Martin 2001] 
also deploys a negotiation-based partner selection scheme. Agents implementing ADMF 
are able to dynamically reorganize the structure of a group of agents to meet the needs of 
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their current situation. ADMF provides a spectrum of power relations between agents, 
from locally autonomous to master-slave. By dynamically changing the decision-making 
framework through negotiation, agents can find whom to work with and how to work 
with them. ADMF allows a dynamic adjustment of agents’ relationships but because of 
the complexity of the negotiation process ADMF can suffer a scalability problem in a 
large-scale system. Also, due to the assumption about commitment to the agreement, the 
agents are assumed to be cooperative. Especially, ADMF is designed for a system where 
agents have shared global goals and the structures among agents are targeted to maximize 
these global goals. 
Coalition formation seeks to partition the agents in a system into groups which 
maximize the utility of the group or the individual agent. The partitioning of the agents is 
usually modeled as a characteristic function game and involves three activities 
[Sandholm and Lesser 1997]: coalition structure generation, solving the optimization 
problem of each coalition, and pay-off division. Among these three activities, coalition 
structure generation and optimization are closely related to finding appropriate 
partnerships from a set of potential groupings. Pay-off division is to decide how the 
utility gained by forming a coalition should be distributed among the agents to keep the 
coalition stable. While pay-off division has been a major issue in the coalition formation 
research and is useful for maintaining or encouraging agents’ collaboration, recent focus 
has been on coalition structure generation [Banerjee and Sen 2002; Klusch and Gerber 
2002; Dutta and Sen 2003; Dang and Jennings 2004] in addition to the earlier research 
[Ketchpel 1993; Shehory and Kraus 1995; Shehory and Kraus 1996; Sandholm, Larson 
et al. 1998].   
Generally, the formation of a coalition involves the negotiation process [Ketchpel 
1993]. Ketchpel identified four phases of coalition formation which are the 
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communication phase, calculation phase, offers phase, and unification phase. The 
communication phase locates other agents that may have compatible or overlapping 
goals, or agents that may have complementary skills. When an agent communicates with 
potential partners, the information which is necessary to calculate the Shapley value 
[Shapley 1953b] is delivered to the potential partners. The Shapley value represents each 
agent’s aggregated contribution to the coalition, and the value is dependent on the order 
of agents joining the coalition. In the calculation phase, the Shapley values for each 
permutation of the coalition structures are calculated. Calculation of the Shapley values 
for all the permutations is an exponential operation, so the calculation is limited to pairs 
of agents only. Each agent creates a preference ordering of the partners based on the 
calculated Shapley value. In the offers phase, the matching is decided using a modified 
stable marriage algorithm [Shapley 1953b]. When a pair of agents forms a stable 
matching, they form a coalition in the unification phase, and in the next round of 
communication, the coalition acts as a single agent. This process of interaction and 
negotiation to form a coalition makes the membership global to the agents, meaning the 
agents, at least in the same coalition group, know who is in the group.  
On the other hand, partner selection in this research gives a local perspective of 
partnerships, meaning that only the information consumers know who is partnering with 
them. In addition, instead of having an explicit negotiation process − including the 
Ketchpel’s communication, calculation, offers, and unification phases to obtain 
cooperation agreements − this work takes a different approach when attempting to 
motivate cooperation so that partners are ready to affirmatively reply to requests and 
enter into partnerships. 
Most of the coalitions are disjoint [Ketchpel 1993; Shehory and Klaus 1995; 
Sandholm, Larson et al. 1998; Banerjee and Sen 2002] except Shehory and Kraus 
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[1996]. Shehory and Kraus provide an approach to allow overlapping coalitions, 
meaning an agent can be a member of more than one coalition. The overlapping 
membership is possible via the precedence ordering of goals, and it reduces the waste of 
resources and capabilities.  
Because of its local perspective, the partner selection scheme in this research 
always allows overlapping partnerships. Overlapping partnerships are useful in the 
information domain because the information is duplicable. Agents can provide the same 
information to multiple consumers, and can also handle multiple instances of 
information.  
Although Klusch and Gerber [2002] investigate the coalition formation in an 
open and dynamic environment, the resulting coalition is stationary. The stationary 
coalition does not reflect the fluctuation of the environment. Barnerjee and Sen [2002] 
also proposed a stationary coalition formation based on pay-off structure and probability 
of the pay-off. Barnerjee and Sen [2002] assume that there are a finite number of 
interactions, and find the static partnership during the given number of interactions. 
These stationary coalition structures do not work in an open environment. The “best” 
coalition structure at one point in time may no longer be the best one in the near future. 
Therefore, dynamic coalition structure or partnerships are necessary to adapt to the 
environment, and are investigated in this work. 
The coalition formation process is also computationally expensive. For example, 
the stable marriage algorithm [Ketchpel 1993] or set covering algorithm [Shehory and 
Klaus 1995] used to find the best coalition structure requires a significant amount of 
computation. Some research focuses on the efficiency of the coalition structure 
generation [Sandholm, Larson et al. 1998; Dang and Jennings 2004]. Sandholm et al. 
[1998] focused on the resource-bounded agents and proposed an anytime algorithm, 
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which has the worst case bound. Dang and Jennings [2004] improve the efficiency of 
Sandholm’s algorithm while keeping the worst case bound guarantee.  
Some of the approaches assume super-additivity [Ketchpel 1993; Shehory and 
Klaus 1995], which may not hold in the real-world problem. There are costs for forming 
a coalition, and this cost should be taken care of. The proposed approach in this research 
takes care of the cost incurred by interacting with information sources by considering the 
tradeoffs between the benefits gained by the partnership and the costs of interaction.  
In summary, negotiation-based partner selection is generally computationally 
expensive, and requires a clear agreement about the relationships. Also, because of the 
computational burden and the requirement of agreement, agents may not be able to 
dynamically change partners. In addition, agents in a system need to share a common 
protocol or language. However, clear memberships help reduce uncertainty about partner 
selection, and can also provide stable and stationary relationships for long-term 
interactions.  
 
2.1.3 Middle Agents 
Middle agents [Decker, Sycara et al. 1997] provide a way of finding appropriate 
partners. A middle agent is an arbiter who actually helps agents find partners based on 
preferences or capabilities. Based on the explicit privacy concerns, middle agents can be 
categorized into anonymizer, matchmaker, recommender, arbitrator, broker, blackboard, 
introducer, etc. In other words, according to the degree of sharing of the information 
about preferences of requesters and the capabilities of providers, the role of middle agents 
can be different. However, the basic idea behind the middle agent is to deploy designated 
help provider in finding appropriate partners. Middle agents have been used in various 
application areas such as service discovery, lookup solutions for peer-to-peer networks, 
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information retrieval, referral network, and Web-services (e.g.,[Ratnasamy, Francis et al. 
2001] [Garofalakis, Panagis et al. 2004] [Yu and Singh 2003a] [Ludwig and Santen 
2002] [Trastour, Bartolini et al. 2001]). While middle agents provide a practical solution 
for partner selection, the agents who want to contact the middle agents need to follow the 
communication protocol, which may not be always available for every agent. Also, a 
single point of failure from a single middle agent can cause a problem although it is 
possible to use various fault-tolerant schemes. Scalability is another issue, but 
hierarchical middle agents can improve the scalability to some degree.  
In the following sections, related work to the collaborations among self-interested 
agents is presented. A game-theoretic approach for promoting collaboration as well as 
payoff division in coalition formation has been investigated in the literatures. A 
reciprocity-based approach and free-rider avoidance in peer-to-peer networks are also 
presented. 
 
2.2 COLLABORATION AMONG SELF-INTERESTED AGENTS  
Research on collaboration and cooperation among self-interested agents focuses 
on (1) how self-interested agents can be encouraged to collaborate and (2) how each 
agent can decide on the strategy for collaboration. 
In seminal work by Axelrod [Axlerod 1984], it is shown that cooperation can 
emerge in a world of self-interested entities based on reciprocity and that the emerging 
cooperation is stable if the interaction is for long enough. The problem of encouraging 
agents to collaborate is also addressed in coalition formation (team formation) and 
incentive/penalty mechanisms in peer-to-peer systems. In coalition formation, in addition 
to determining memberships of agents, fair distribution of profits (i.e., payoff division) 
for stable coalition has been addressed in a number of studies. Incentive/penalty 
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mechanisms in peer-to-peer systems induce self-interested rational agents to contribute to 
the system. By granting incentives to more collaborative agents and penalizing selfish 
agents, free-riders or whitewashers can be avoided.  
In addition to promoting collaboration, the problem of selecting the best strategies 
for collaboration has been addressed from different perspectives. The challenge for best 
strategy selection comes from local situational awareness. Because of the limit on 
perceiving other agents’ strategies in competitive environments, the strategy of 
collaboration affects the performance of individual self-interested agents.  
In the following sections, previous work on collaboration among self-interested 
agents is provided, and discussion about the relationship with this research is presented.  
 
2.2.1 Game-theoretic Approach for Collaboration 
Motivating collaboration is meaningful to self-interested agents only if 
interactions are repeated. In repeated interactions, self-interested agents can expect future 
benefits of collaborating with others. As a framework for modeling interactions among 
agents and to develop a mechanism to promote collaboration, game theory has been 
widely deployed.   
Axelrod [1984] investigated a model of cooperation based on the Iterative 
Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD). The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is a type of general-sum game 
where two players can have the choice to either cooperate or defect. Each player in a PD 
game is interested in maximizing its own rewards. The reward structure in generalized 
form is shown in Table 1, where the left element in each cell is a reward for player 1 and 
the right element is a reward for player 2, with the relationship among rewards satisfying 
the inequalities T > R > P > S. 
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In a one-shot PD game, defecting gives a higher payoff no matter what the other 
agent’s action is. Therefore, if all players are rational, they will select defect. However, in 
repeated interactions, a Tit-For-Tat strategy by Anatol Rapport, which starts from 
cooperation on the first move and do the same as the other player’s action from the next 
move, has been shown to be the most powerful [Axlerod 1984]. Tit-For-Tat gives a 
chance to punish a non-cooperative player in the following move, and the optimal choice 
can move to cooperating. The research in this dissertation adopts a variation of Tit-For-
Tat for continuous action space as a strategy for information providers, because the action 
space for agents from a provider’s perspective is defined as continuous. 
Table 1 Reward Structure for Prisoner's Dilemma 
 Player2 
 Cooperate Defect 





Defect T, S P, P 
 
Azoulay-Schwartz and Kraus [Azoulay-Schwartz and Kraus 2001, 2004] suggest 
a stable strategy for information exchanging agents from a provider’s perspective. They 
modeled information exchange as a stage game so that a consumer and a provider take 
turns. A variation of Tit-For-Tat was proposed as a strategy profile by taking into account 
the previous action history. Modeling information exchange as a stage game can be 
reasonable in a synchronized message passing system. However, in general, message 
passing among agents may not be assumed to be always synchronized. Agents can 
request information any time they need, and the requests can also be made 
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asynchronously. Also, Azoulay-Schwartz and Kraus assume a single information element 
and two players, meaning their modeling and analysis assume a single type of 
information between two agents, while different types of information requests from 
multiple agents can occur in multi-agent systems. In addition, the assumption that 
interactions with multiple agents can be explained by applying the two-player game 
multiple times may not work in more complex situations because of the dependence of 
information and different reward structure for different situations.  
The research in this dissertation adopts a stochastic game theory so that providers’ 
actions and consumers’ actions can be considered together while accommodating the 
changes of the information requirements. Also, by deploying the stochastic games, 
interactions for multiple information elements with multiple agents can also be taken care 
of. In addition, this research does not assume that the information from information 
providers is always true. Regardless of the intention of information providers, the 
provided information can be faulty and can contain errors. The errors can be either from 
information providers’ incapability, or generated intentionally by the providers. In order 
to take care of the accuracy and consistency of the provided information, this research 
introduces a trustworthiness measure into the reward function. 
  
2.2.2 Coalition Formation – Payoff Division 
Coalition formation has been an important issue both in cooperative and 
competitive agent systems [Kahan and Rapoport 1984]. In a cooperative environment, 
agents in a coalition pursue the maximization of social or global utility, and the agents 
stay in the coalition as long as global utility can benefit from the coalition. In competitive 
environments, the stability of coalition is affected by a payoff division scheme since each 
agent is self-interested and tries to maximize its own utility. The question of how social 
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goods (i.e., payoff) from forming a coalition can be divided or distributed among 
participating agents so that agents are motivated to stay in a coalition has been 
investigated in a number of studies.  
In the early literature by Kahan and Rapoport [1984], the payoff to a coalition is 
distributed to each agent, with the expected payoff for each agent equal to the Shapley 
value. Calculating the Shapley value is computationally expensive and it is difficult to 
find the optimal distribution in large-scale systems. Also, in order to use the Shapley 
value, it is assumed that agents have the common knowledge on the value of coalition. In 
more realistic situations, the expected payoff of each coalition structure, thus the 
expected payoff to each agent, can differ for different agents. Ketchpel [1994] addressed 
this problem with the Two Agent Auction mechanism. The purpose of the Two Agent 
Auction is to solve the division of utility or payoff in the presence of uncertainty. When 
two agents form a coalition of size 2, they play the role of one agent, and the auction 
repeats until the optimal coalition is established.  
Sandholm and Lesser [1995] address the issues of coalition formation in terms of 
optimality and stability. While the optimality of a coalition looks at the structure of 
coalition in super-additive environments, the stability of a coalition is investigated as a 
payoff distribution problem using the solution concept of the core. The core is a set of 
vectors, where each vector in the core represents payoff to the agents such that agents are 
not able to be better off by leaving the coalition structure. Building a coalition under the 
solution concept of the core enables agents to be motivated to construct a stable coalition, 
but this requires a significant computation and common knowledge about the solution 
concept.  
Shehory and Kraus [1999] deploy the solution concept of the kernel for stable 
payoff division. The kernel is a set of configurations where all coalitions in the 
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configurations are in equilibrium. The equilibrium of a coalition is achieved when each 
pair of agents in the coalition is in equilibrium, meaning each agent cannot outweigh one 
another in the coalition. A coalition is kernel-stable (K-stable) if all the pairs of agents in 
a coalition are in equilibrium. 
The computational burden of constructing a coalition can reduce the flexibility of 
building a new coalition in dynamic environments. Klusch and Gerber [2002] have 
developed a dynamic coalition formation scheme (DCF-S). In a DCF-S, each agent takes 
steps of preparation, simulation, negotiation, and evaluation, and agents form a 
potentially overlapping coalition in order to solve a set of cooperative games with stable 
payoff distribution. 
In summary, cooperation can be induced by payoff division. If the payoff division 
scheme satisfies the agents, then the coalition is stable and the agents in the coalition can 
be motivated to cooperate with others to get their portions of the payoff. The basic idea 
for motivating the agents to cooperate is to give them a set of benefits. However, in an 
open environment, it is hard to know how beneficial the cooperation is to an agent. An 
agent’s benefit or utility is dependent on the other agents’ degree of cooperation as well 
as the agent’s own degree of cooperation.  
In information sharing networks, when the information sources (agents) are 
completely cooperative so they are willing to provide information whenever the 
information is requested, an agent gains the maximum benefit if the agent is completely 
selfish and requests all the required information from those information sources assuming 
no cost. On the other hand, if the requesting agent is completely cooperative and the 
information sources are also cooperative, so the agent does not request any information, 
the agent gains nothing from those sources and may not be able to achieve its goals. In 
addition, considering the information supply (the exchange of information between 
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information suppliers and receivers) as a form of cooperation in the information domain, 
there is uncertainty in many aspects such as the information quality, cost of information 
delivery, etc. in an open environment, and an agent’s benefit is affected also by those 
factors – quality and cost. Previous approaches do not take into account the quality of 
shared information although the utility is actually dependent not only on the amount of 
the information shared by others, but also on the quality of the information shared by 
others. The proposed work in this research takes into account the quality of the 
information shared by information providers for modeling the utility function for 
cooperation.  
In addition to these payoff division schemes in coalition formation for 
encouraging collaboration, reciprocity-based approaches also aim to build collaborative 
relationships between self-interested mutually beneficial agents using bidirectional 
dependence.  
 
2.2.3 Reciprocity-based Collaboration 
Sichman et al. [1994] proposed a social reasoning mechanism using dependence 
networks. Dependence networks are used for defining the taxonomy of dependence 
situations and can be used for making up the capabilities of agents. A data structure 
called external description, which is composed of goals, actions, resources, and plans, is 
used to store the information about others, and the external description is used to build 
the dependence networks of each agent. While this approach provides a useful and 
descriptive mechanism for building collaborative relationships with others, the adaptation 
to dynamics of goal achievement (e.g. goal change, partial achievement) is not explicitly 
taken care of.   
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Saha [2004] and Sen et al. [Saha, Sen et al. 2003; Sen, Dutta et al. 2003] 
propose a decision mechanism for constructing collaborative relationships among self-
interested agents based on expertise reciprocity. The decision mechanism aids in agents’ 
decisions about whether to accept other agents’ help requests for tasks or not. The 
decision is based on the cost metric from past interaction and expected future savings by 
reciprocal collaborative relationships. This work differs from the research in this 
dissertation in that this work assumes system-wide goals and focus on giving information 
providers’ collaboration strategies, while the research in this dissertation provides 
strategies for both providers and requesters. Also, this paper uses a goal-oriented metric 
for designing the reward structure, while they consider the reduction of cost. 
Peer-to-peer networks (P2P networks) do not have central authority to control 
each node in the network. This distributed nature of the environment and the openness 
that any agents can join the system make free-rider avoidance a significant problem in 
P2P networks. In the following section, the work addressing free-rider avoidance by 
providing incentives to collaborative agents is provided. 
 
2.2.4 Free-rider Avoidance in Peer-to-peer Systems 
Free riders are those who get the incentive without contributing to others. An 
example of a free rider might be one who does not share files with others but downloads 
what others provide in a peer-to-peer file sharing system. Free riding happens because 
sharing the files results in the allocation of the resources for others, and that can reduce 
the resources which could be dedicated to downloading other contributors’ files. Most 
approaches to the free-rider problem are to give incentive to those who contribute, and 
this concept of incentive is modeled in a game-theoretic framework [Golle, Leyton-
Brown et al. 2001; Lui, Lang et al. 2002; Burahgohain, Agrawal et al. 2003; Yu and 
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Singh 2003b]. In Golle, Leyton-Brown et al. [2001], an agent’s utility is dependent on a 
variety of different factors including the size of the download, network variety, disk 
space used, bandwidth used, altruism, and the financial transfer. A micro-payment 
mechanism is deployed to realize the financial transfer and to encourage each node to 
balance what they take from the system with what they contribute to the system. In 
contrast to Golle, Leyton-Brown et al. [2001], the utility model in Burahgohain, Agrawal 
et al. [2003] adopted a probabilistic service differentiation using a benefit matrix. An 
agent’s utility is determined by the amount of information shared by an agent’s peer and 
the probability that the peer would accept the request from the agent. The costs for 







Agents can derive benefits by receiving help from other agents when the agents 
are not self-sufficient in satisfying their own requirements for goal achievement. When 
agents need a set of information elements but are not self-sufficient in information 
acquisition, information elements from other agents can increase the satisfaction of the 
information acquisition, thus the goal achievement.  
In a system where agents are assumed to be cooperative, information providers 
are willing to provide requested information if available. Information requesting agents 
(i.e., consumer agents) need to select an appropriate set of information providers so that 
they can procure all the necessary information of high quality at the least cost.  
This chapter provides an approach for enabling consumer agents with a set of 
information requirements to select the most appropriate information providers by 
defining a set of evaluation metrics for providers (Section 3.3.1) and by proposing search 
methods for finding the solution (Section 3.3.2). 
 
3.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
An agent’s information requirements (RQ) are a set of required information 
elements for goal achievement. The agent with information requirements is a consumer 
agent. Provider agents have a set of available information elements (PR) which they can 
provide when requested. There can be multiple provider agents that can provide the same 
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information elements. Figure 3 shows a typical example of the problem. In the figure, 
agent 0 requires 4 information elements (RQ(a0)={B, R, G, O}) and provider agents 
(agents 1, 2, 3) have information available, respectively PR(a1)={B, G, O}, PR(a2)={R, 
G, O}, PR(a3)={B, R, G}. Although provider agents are willing to provide requested 
information, the quality of the provided information can be different. Also, the cost for 
obtaining the same information elements may vary depending on information providers. 
Therefore, the consumer agent (agent 0) needs to select the best set of information 















Figure 3 Example of the Partner Selection Problem 
In general, a consumer agent’s decision-making process can be represented by a 
finite state machine (Figure 4). A consumer agent has a single state of information 
requirements. Transitions are circular to the initial state since the interaction is repeated 
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and the providers always provide requested information. The transition is triggered by the 
actions of the consumer agent (information requests) and replies from providers. In the 
repeated interactions, a consumer agent’s objective is to acquire the most trustworthy 
information elements in terms of quality while maximizing the coverage of information 
requirements at the least cost (in other words, to request information from the providers 
such that (max( , ) ^ min( ))
providers
arg Quality Coverage Cost . The challenge for achieving this 
objective is that the quality of the provided information from each provider agent may not 
be known to the agent requesting the information. This challenge can be overcome by 
equipping consumer agents with the capability of modeling other agents. In other words, 
consumer agents can perform trustworthiness evaluation of provider agents.  
 
 
Figure 4 Finite State Machine for Consumer Agent's Decision Process 
In the following sections, the details of provider modeling and evaluation metrics 
containing goal coverage, cost, and trustworthiness are provided, followed by the search 








This section provides an approach for enabling consumer agents with a set of 
information requirements to select the most appropriate information providers by 
defining a set of evaluation metrics for providers (Section 3.3.1) and by proposing search 
methods for finding the solution (Section 3.3.2) 
 
3.3.1 Provider Evaluation 
Provider evaluation metrics for partner selection – coverage, cost, trustworthiness 
– are provided in detail in the following sub-sections. 
 
3.3.1.1 Coverage 
Coverage represents the relevance of the information, and the relevance of a set of 
information from a set of information sources is decided by the degree to which the 
agent’s information requirements are met [Barber and Park 2004a]. The following 
notation and assumptions are introduced in order to define the coverage metri: 
 A consumer agent can have multiple goals (G(ai)={gn}). 
 Each goal gn is assigned a weight w(gn). 
 Each goal of an agent has a set of information requirements { }
ng k
R r= . 
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= ∪ . 
The priority of an information requirement is introduced to describe the 
importance of each requirement or the relevance of requirements to goals. The priority of 
each information requirement is represented by PRIO(ai, rk), and the assignment of 
priority value is decided by the consumer agent with the assumption that the information 
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requirements are mutually exclusive. Higher priority is assigned to the information 
requirements which contribute to more goals. In that case, the priority of an information 
requirement is defined as follows: 
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Given the priority of each information requirement, goal coverage by selecting a 
set of provider agents (S) as information providers is the portion of the priority sum 
covered by S. The coverage of selecting S is the average goal coverage for all goals. The 
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As an example of measuring coverage for selected provider agents, assume there 

















Figure 5 Coverage Example 
In Figure 5, agent 0 is a consumer agent and has two goals (g1, g2) with 
information requirements of each goal, 
1 2 3
{ , }gR r r= , 2 1 2{ , }gR r r=  constituting agent 0’s 
information requirement RQ(a0)={r1, r2, r3}. Provider agents (agent 1, 2, 3) have 
available information elements such that PR(a1)={r1, r2}, PR(a2)={r2, r3}, and 
PR(a3)={r1, r3}. The weights on goals are assumed to be w(g1)=2, w(g2)=1. From the 
information requirements and weights on goals, each information requirement is assigned 




1( , ) 0.5
2
2 1( , ) 1.5
2 2










If agent 0 requests r1, r2, r3 from a1, a2, a3 respectively, goal coverage for each 
goal and coverage value from the selected provider agents become: 
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GoalCoverage(a0, {a2, a3}, g1) = (1.5+1)/(1.5+1) = 1 
GoalCoverage(a0, {a1, a2}, g2) = (1.5+0.5)/(1.5+0.5) = 1 
Coverage(a0, {a1, a2, a3}, {g1, g2})=(1+1)/2=1 
 
On the other hand, if agent 0 requests r2, r3 from a1, a2 respectively but does not 
request r1, then goal coverage for each goal and coverage value from the selected 
provider agents become 
 
GoalCoverage(a0, {a1, a2}, g1) = (1.5+1)/(1.5+1) = 1 
GoalCoverage(a0, {a2}, g2) = (1.5+0.5)/1.5 = 0.75 
Coverage(a0, {a1, a2, a3}, {g1, g2})=(1+1)/(1+0.75)=0.875 
 
If an agent is concerned only about satisfying the information requirements, the 
objective is to maximize Coverage. However, there can be multiple different source 
combinations which maximize Coverage. The choice of information source combination 
can affect the robustness of the goal achievement. Assume there are 2 instances of source 
combinations which maximize Coverage where one instance consists of a higher number 
of provider agents (e.g., 3 information elements from 3 provider agents) and another 
instance of a lower number of provider agents (e.g., 3 information elements from 1 
provider agent). If an agent prefers the first case – more provider agents – the agent is 
less dependent on the undesirable (as well as desirable) behavior of those provider agents. 
On the other hand, if an agent prefers the second case – less provider agents – the agent is 
more dependent on the undesirable (as well as desirable) behavior of those information 
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sources. The decision of which information source combination to choose in those cases 
is a design consideration of agent designers. 
 
3.3.1.2 Cost 
When an agent has unlimited resources for the information acquisition process, 
the agent should pursue the highest quality information possible. However, an agent is 
often limited by the information costs it can afford; therefore, the agent must address the 
quality and efficiency tradeoffs between acquiring quality information at a reasonable 
cost [Park and Barber 2004]. 
Information cost is derived from the message-passing and computational burden 
required to communicate information. In many information networks, such as ad-hoc 
networks, agents are not connected to every source. As a result, information must pass 
through other providers (providers willing to relay information) to arrive at the requesting 
agent, and consequently information cost is increased. In this research it is assumed, for 
simplicity, that information cost is directly proportional to the number of messages each 
agent needs to handle. As a consumer agent with N information requirements, the 
minimum number of messages including requests and replies in each round is 2N in a 
partner selection problem because each provider is willing to provide requested 
information. The cost of information acquisition plays a significant role for selecting 
provider agents if the willingness of information supply is not assumed as in the 
collaboration problem in the next chapter. If provider agents are not willing to provide 
the requested information but can choose whether to provide or not, a consumer agent 
may need to request information multiple times causing a cost increase. Although cost is 
defined as a message complexity in this research, it should be noted that other 
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information cost such as the hop-by-hop message delivery cost or the real cost of 
information when the information is not free can be incorporated into cost calculations. 
 
3.3.1.3 Trustworthiness 
The trustworthiness of an information provider agent can be represented by the 
probability that the provided information is true, or the probability distribution of the 
error of the provided information from the true value [Fullam and Barber 2004]. 
However, it is not always possible to know the true value of provided information. Thus, 
a statistical modeling of provided information and providers [Fullam and Barber 2004] is 
extended to estimate the true value and errors of the information, although we do not 
limit our trustworthiness evaluation to a specific evaluation mechanism for generality.  
In Fullam and Barber [2004], a belief revision algorithm based on a set of 
policies for information valuation is proposed. Belief is an agent’s perspective model of 
truth, or something believed as true, on some subject at some time. The policies include 
the preference to the information from the reliable sources with high certainty in 
information quality, as well as the preference for agreed-upon information from as many 
sources as possible. The source reliability model is for trustworthiness evaluation in this 
research. In this model, belief distribution mean Bµ  and belief distribution standard 
deviation Bσ  are used to represent a belief. Source distribution is a distribution of 
source reports represented by source distribution mean 
is
µ  and source distribution 
standard deviation 
is
σ . The trustworthiness of an information source (called reputation 
or reliability in Fullam and Barber [2004]) is modeled as a distribution of source report 
errors. Since the reliability of information source concerns the errors of the reported 
information and the agent does not know the truth value of the information, the 
distribution 
is
ρ  of the source report errors use the mean difference α between the 
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reported values and the belief of the agent. Therefore, the distribution 
is
ρ  after N 
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where ( ) ( ) ( )
is B
t t tα µ µ= − . Since the mean value describes the accuracy and the 
standard deviation describes the consistency of the information source, we define the 
trustworthiness of a provider agent s as a linear combination of those two values as:  
 
, ,( | | (1 ) )
1( , )
1 s si B z
Trust a s
e ρ ρξ µ ξ σ+ − −
=
+ , where 0 1ξ≤ ≤  
The weight factor   is decided depending on whether an agent a values accuracy 
or consistency. B is the growth rate and z is a domain-specific bias parameter. Depending 
on the domain-specific bias parameter, an agent can take an optimistic or pessimistic 
trustworthiness evaluation approach. When an agent evaluates the trustworthiness of 
multiple sources, it is reasonable to take an average of the selected sources. 
Given three evaluation parameters, a combined metric for a set of provider 
selection for respective information requirements is defined as follows: 
ξ
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Ideally, the best information provider combination yields the information supply 










Figure 6 Ideal Partner Selection 
In practice, the objective of a consumer agent is to decide a set of provider agents 
S such that the combined reward or utility is maximized by considering the tradeoffs 
among those three metrics, 
'
arg max ( , ')i
S
S E a S= . 
 
3.3.2 Selecting Information Providers 
The ultimate objective of an information consumer agent is to select a set of 
information providers which maximize the information acquisition utility. However, from 
an AI planning perspective [Sacerdoti 1975; Korf 1987; Selman, Levesque et al. 1992; 
Park and Barber 2005a], it is often essential for an agent to satisfy the information 
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requirements when there are available information providers. Therefore, the 
maximization of the information acquisition utility function is pursued in two different 
ways in this dissertation. First, when an information consumer agent is able to satisfy the 
information requirements from other information providers, an information consumer 
agent pursues the maximization of the coverage first, even if the highest quality or the 
lowest cost cannot be guaranteed, and then tries to maximize the rest of the evaluation 
metrics. In other words, an information consumer agent compares the trustworthiness and 
cost of the information providers who can together satisfy the information requirements. 
This approach often helps reduce the complexity of selecting the solution by pruning out 
the unnecessary solutions while guaranteeing the acquisition of all the required 
information. Second, when an information consumer agent is not able to satisfy the 
information requirements from other information providers, the information consumer 
agent pursues the maximization of the proposed utility. Depending on the agent 
designer’s objective, each metric can be weighted in a different way, but still the 
objective is to maximize the coverage and quality while minimizing the cost in a given 
situation. 
 
3.3.3 Search  
When a single information provider per information requirement is assumed, the 
consumer agent may pursue the optimal information providers based on the defined 
evaluation metrics. However, when multiple information providers can be selected per 
information requirement (which is often the case in belief revision processes), selecting 
the best set of information providers may be intractable because of the explosion of the 
search space size. This section provides heuristic search techniques for selecting “good-
enough” partners in the presence of computational bounds. 
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3.3.3.1 Search Space Construction: Information Source Combinations Pool 
The partner selection process aims to select the best information providers which 
maximize the reward function ( , )iE a S . The naïve approach to finding the best 
information sources is to investigate every possible combination of information providers 
which satisfies an agent’s information requirements for its goals and pick the one which 
yields the highest expected reward value. The first phase for the proposed partner 
selection process is to build a search space, which consists of a set of nodes representing 
potential information source combinations. Since each instance of information source 
combination {S(ai,rk)} constitutes a node in a search space, we use a simple notation to 
represent an instance of information source combination. A node in a search space is 
represented by M-tuple which uses the index of element in the tuple as the index of 
information requirement. Therefore, the M-tuple is constructed as follows: 
 
1( , ),..., ( , )i i MS a r S a r< > : a node in a search space 
 
The search space is constructed as a graph called the Information Source 
Combinations Pool (ICP). In the graph, 1( , ),..., ( , )i i MS a r S a r< >  is a node and there 
exists an edge between two nodes where a single information source addition for a single 
information requirement can be mapped into the other connected node. For example, 
there is an edge between <{a2, a4}, {a2, a3}, {a3, a4}> and <{a2}, {a2, a3}, {a3, a4}>, 
because <{a2, a4}, {a2, a3}, {a3, a4}> can be made by adding a source a4 for r1 to  






















































































Figure 7 Partial Construction of Information Source Combination Pool 
For each information requirement, rk, an agent ai can select at least one to at most 
|S(ai,rk)| sources. Also, for different numbers of sources, multiple combinations are 
possible, so for a single information requirement rk, the number of possible combinations 




S a r jj
C
=∑ . In the search space, there are ( )| ( , )| | ( , )|11 k kM S a r S a r jjk C== ∑∏  nodes 
with M information requirements, and it is necessary to compare all the nodes to select 
the best node, which is the best combination of information sources. However, the search 
space is extremely large as the number of information requirements increases, or the 
number of sources for each information element increases. Therefore, instead of 
exploring the whole search space, this research provides a heuristic search technique 
(Hill-Climbing with Mutation Operation), which is a modified version of hill climbing, 
and incrementally improves the search result at each timestep. 
The implication of the edge between the nodes of a single source change in the 
ICP is to let an agent make use of the locality of the search space while making it easier 
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to expand the exploration of search space. The currently selected partners are supposed to 
be the best sources combination up to the current timestep, and the partners are replaced 
by new partners when the new partners are proved to (1) include more better partners, (2) 
exclude bad partners from the current partners or (3) be an almost or completely new set 
of information sources having a higher evaluation value than the current ones. In the case 
of (1) and (2), it is likely that large parts of the current partners are still included. 
Therefore, it is desirable to keep the search path near the current node because it is more 
likely that a better node exists near the current node. By harnessing this locality, a search 
can be efficiently performed. However, depending only on the locality, it can reach a 
local optimum or slow down the search in the case of (3), so we need to expand the 
exploration of the search space to reduce the possibility of the local optimum. Expanding 
the exploration in turn costs more and may waste the resource if the exploration does not 
return a better result. The hill-climbing with mutation operation concurrently takes care 
of both the exploitation, by adopting a hill-climbing search method, and the exploration 
by adopting a mutation operation borrowed from genetic algorithms. Before we discuss 
the search algorithm in detail, we will give an illustration of search space construction 
with an example. 
The following example is used to describe the approach: 
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Then, an Information Source Combination Pool (ICP) can be built as in Figure 8 






















































































Figure 8 Information Source Combination Pool (ICP) 
In this figure, the root node is a node which contains all the sources for all the 
requirements, and the bottom node is an unreachable empty source combination. We can 
see there is an edge between two nodes where a single information source addition for a 
single information requirement can be mapped into another connected node. Although, 
this graph shows the whole structure of the nodes and edges, an agent does not build the 
whole space but rather expands the connected nodes from the current node when it is 
necessary. 
 
3.3.3.2 Search Algorithms 
We deploy a hill-climbing search algorithm [Rich and Knight 1991] and a 
mutation operation from a genetic algorithm [Holland 1975]. Hill-climbing is a heuristic 
search to head towards a state which is better than the current state. Therefore, we can 
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always get a result which is better than or at least equal to the current state. However, the 
problem is that the hill-climbing can fall in a local optimum. Mutation operation helps 
reduce the possibility of a local optimum problem. Mutation serves to generate a new 
node to be inspected by applying a simple modification rule to the current node, and 
enables random walks in the search to detect a local optimum and helps escape from the 
local optimum.  
  
3.3.3.2.1 Hill Climbing 
The hill-climbing search method is applied to the Information Source 
Combinations Pool (ICP) to find the best information source combination. The initial 
node can be set to be either a root node in the ICP or a random node. Each time, agent ai 
executes PartnerSelection(ai) to compare the currently selected information sources 
(Ssel(ai)) with the connected nodes ({S(ai)}). If there is a node which is evaluated to be a 
better source combination than the current one, ai switches to the new partners. 
Therefore, ai can select an information source combination which is better than or equal 
to the current one. Since only the current node and the connected nodes are inspected, an 




        Ssel(ai) = current partners 
        for connected nodes {S(ai)} of Ssel(ai) in ICP 
                  if ( , ( )) ( , ( ))i i i sel iE a S a E a S a>  
                            Ssel(ai) = S(ai) 
                  end if 
        end for 
Algorithm 1 Hill-Climbing Search in Information Source Combination Pool 
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3.3.3.2.2 Hill Climbing with Mutation Operation 
The hill-climbing method can confront a local optimum. In order to escape from 
the local optimum, it is necessary to observe additional nodes which are reasonably far 
away from the current node. However, there are tradeoffs in adding more nodes for 
comparison. Additional nodes can either contribute to escaping from the local optimum 
or waste an agent’s computation resources.  
A mutation operation found in genetic algorithms [Holland 1975] can help 
prevent a local optimum by randomly changing a part of the results. The mutation 
operation is diverse and very dependent on the encoding scheme of the elements in a 
search space. The most popular mutation operator involves bit inversions in binary 
encoding. The bit inversion in binary encoding will randomly switch a few chosen bits 
from 1 to 0 or 0 to 1. For example, if a node is represented as 10010011 in binary, 
possible results of mutation are 11010011 or 10100011. 11010011 is a switch of the 
second bit from 0 to 1, and 10100011 is a switch of the third and the fourth bits from 0 to 
1 and 1 to 0. In this research, a node in the ICP is encoded as 
1( , ),..., ( , )i i MS a r S a r< > representing the selected information sources for a corresponding 
information requirement. Thus, this research will derive reasonable mutation operations 
which help circumvent a local optimum. In Algorithm 2, we show how mutation can be 
added to the hill-climbing search algorithm.  
The idea is to inspect mutated nodes after selecting a set of information sources. If 
there is an information source combination in a set of mutated nodes which is better than 
the selected information sources, an agent takes the newly found combination as the best 
information source combination. Smutation(ai, Ssel(ai)) represents an information source 
combination which is mutated from Ssel(ai), which results from applying MUTATION 




        Ssel(ai) = current partners 
        for connected nodes {S(ai)} of Ssel(ai) in ICP 
                  if ( , ( )) ( , ( ))i i i sel iE a S a E a S a>  
                            Ssel(ai) = S(ai) 
                  end if 
        end for 
        {Smutation(ai,Ssel(ai))} = MUTATION (Ssel(ai)) 
        for all Smutation(ai,Ssel(ai)) 
                if ( , ( , ( ))) ( , ( ))i mutation i i i sel iE a S a S a E a S a>  
                             Ssel(ai) = Smutation(ai ,S(ai)) 
                end if 
        end for 
Algorithm 2 Hill-Climbing Search with Mutation Operation in ICP 
   
MUTATION (Ssel(ai)): 
 
     SourceInversion (Ssel(ai)) 
          for k such that 1 k M≤ ≤  
               
return ( , ) ( , )
,  ( , ), ( , ) ( , )
sel i k sel i k i j
i sel i k j sel i k j i k
S a r S a r r r
where r S a r r S a r r S a r
′ = − +
∈ ∉ ∧ ∈  
          end for 
     ComplementaryInversion (Ssel(ai)) 
          for , ( , ) ( , ) ( , )sel i k i k sel i kk S a r S a r S a r∀ = −  
               
' ( , ),  ( , )return ( , )
any one source from ( , ) 
sel i k sel i k
sel i k
i k
S a r if S a rS a r
S a r
⎧ ≠ ∅⎪= ⎨
⎪⎩  
          end for 
     RandomMutation (Ssel(ai)) 
          return random 
' ( , )sel i kS a r ∉connected nodes of Ssel(ai,rk). 
Algorithm 3 Mutation Operations 
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Three different schemes for the MUTATION operator are proposed. The first one 
is the source inversion. Source inversion is inspired by the bit-inversion in binary 
encoding. The idea is to substitute new sources from the non-selected sources with part of 
the currently selected sources, where non-selected sources are the potential sources that 
were not included in the currently selected sources. The second option is the 
complementary inversion, which is an extension of the source inversion. The 
complementary inversion seeks to replace the selected sources for each requirement with 
the new non-selected sources for respective requirements. When the non-selected sources 
are empty, one source is randomly chosen from potential sources. The last option is the 
random mutation. Random mutation is to change the selected node randomly, so it is 
equivalent to selecting another node from ICP which is not directly connected with the 
selected node. These three schemes are summarized in Algorithm 3. 
 
3.4 SUMMARY  
This chapter presents the partner selection algorithms. The objective of partner 
selection schemes is to select the appropriate set of information providers which 
maximize the information acquisition utility. Information acquisition utility is defined in 
terms of coverage, trustworthiness, and cost. Given a set of information providers for 
information requirements, the coverage of selected information providers represents how 
much of the portion of information requirements can be satisfied. Trustworthiness 
represents the accuracy and consistency of the information providers, modeled by the 
error distribution of the providers using statistical methods. The cost of information 
acquisition can occur from various sources. The message complexity of information 
acquisition is used to represent the cost in this dissertation. When the objective of an 
information consumer is to select one information provider per information request, the 
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complexity of finding the optimal solution is not high, but if multiple information 
providers per information requirement can be selected, the computation complexity of 
finding the optimal solution increases exponentially as the size of the system and the 
number of requirements increase. Heuristic search techniques for finding the near-
optimal solution given a limited amount of search time are presented. The heuristic 








In the partner selection problem in the previous chapter, decision-making agents 
are assumed to be information consumers and provider agents are assumed to provide 
requested information if available. In multi-agent systems where agents can be consumers 
and providers at the same time (e.g., grid computing [Czajkowski, Fitzgerald et al. 2001; 
Foster, Kesselman et al. 2001; Smith 2005]) as well as self-interested meaning they are 
interested in achieving their own goals, the provider agents may not want to waste their 
own resources by providing requested information to requesters unless the information 
supply contributes to the providers’ own goal achievement in the future. In other words, 
agents need to be motivated to provide requested information in the way that the 
information supply is beneficial to those providers.  
The potential benefit information providers can expect is the reciprocal supply of 
necessary information from the requesting agents. A prerequisite condition for 
establishing this reciprocally beneficial relationship is information interdependence, 
meaning the agents at both ends are partially or completely complementary about the 
deficient information requirements and available information for others. However, even 
with the existence of reciprocal information interdependence it is difficult for agents to 
figure out the best way to request information and respond to others’ requests when there 
are multiple agents with multiple information elements which need to be provided or are 
available for supply, because of the additional computational complexity and the effect of 
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other agents’ interdependence on the decision of building relationships. In addition, the 
information requirements can dynamically change over time, depending on the ratio of 
the information requirements’ satisfaction from the previous interaction, or agents may 
need a completely different set of information to achieve different goals or sub-goals. 
Therefore, it is necessary for an agent to model the other agents’ action selection about 
information exchange, as well as to figure the best actions based both on the model of 
other agents and its own dynamic information requirements.  
The uncertainty in the quality of provided information can also affect the agents’ 
decision on building relationships with other agents. Agents need to take into account the 
trade off between the quality of information and the probability of acquiring necessary 
information in order to maximize goal achievability. 
In this chapter, agents’ information acquisition utility (i.e., goal achievability) is 
defined using metrics including coverage, cost, and trustworthiness introduced in the 
previous chapter, and agents’ action spaces are defined in terms of requesting strategy as 
information consumers and responding strategy as information providers. The objective 
of the strategies is to enable self-interested agents in the information sharing networks to 
obtain all the necessary information at the least cost, by building collaborative 
relationships with complementary and trustworthy agents while avoiding being exploited 
by selfish agents, using the history of interactions. 
 
4.2 COCOAGENTS: COMPETITIVE COLLABORATING AGENTS 
The Competitive Collaborating Agents (CoCoAgents) are self-interested, but need 
to exchange information with appropriate counterparts. CoCoAgents’ goals impose a set 
of information requirements which need to be satisfied along with a set of information 
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available for other agents. Therefore, CoCoAgents can act as an information consumer 
and a provider at the same time, and two types of decisions need to be made: 
 Strategy for requesting information: an agent’s strategy for requesting 
determines how effectively the agent receives information elements from 
other information providers (i.e., other agents). The acquisition of information 
elements in turn contributes to an agent’s overall rewards. 
 Strategy for responding to other agents’ requests: an agent’s strategy for 
responding to information requests from other agents determines how many 
requests the agent responds to. The reciprocal sharing of information between 
agents may ultimately allow a given agent to better acquire needed 
information elements, which in turn contributes to an agent’s overall rewards. 
Each type of strategy decision is not independent of the other type. An agent’s 
strategy about how to provide information may affect other agents’ strategies for how to 
request information as well as how to respond to the agent’s requests, which can 
eventually affect the agent’s strategy for how to request information. If the decisions 
about requests and responses are made simultaneously, the space size for strategies can 
easily become intractable, and an unrealistic assumption about system-wide synchronous 
message delivery of requests and replies needs to be made for simultaneous decisions. 
Since each type of strategy contributes to the rewards (payoff) in different ways, 
separating each type of strategy and determining how different types of strategies are 
related aids in agents’ decision-making process with regard to designing rewards and 
reducing search space. In the following section, more details of the problem are provided 
followed by the overview of stochastic game theory which is used as a formal framework 
for this research. 
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4.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
B R G O
G O B R
G R B
agent 0 agent 1
agent 2
RQ PR RQ PR
PRRQ
 
Figure 9 Example Scenario of Information Sharing Networks with Information Requirements and 
Available Information 
CoCoAgents play the role of an information providers and consumers at the same 
time. CoCoAgents’ information requirements (RQ) are a set of required information 
elements for goal achievement. Each CoCoAgent also has a set of available information 
elements (PR) for others (Figure 9). Agents join the information sharing networks 
because they are not self-sufficient in terms of information acquisition capability. 
Therefore, the information requirements, which are deficient information, need to be 





Figure 10 CoCoAgent’s Finite State Machine Representation of Information Request Decision 
Making 
CoCoAgents’ internal decision-making process about information requests (i.e., 
selecting the information provider agents) can be represented by a finite state machine as 
in Figure 10. A CoCoAgent has the states of information requirements, and transitions 
from one state to another state are triggered by a product of an information consumer 
agent’s action and provider agents’ actions. Each CoCoAgent i has two types of actions 
defined as follows:  
 Aicon (consumer actions): a set of requests for information requirements in the 
current state. 
 Aiprov (provider actions): a set of responses to requested information elements in 
the current state 
Agents in competitive environments do not usually share an internal model with 
other agents. Thus, the consumer agents do not have access to the quality of provided 
information (i.e., a provider agent’s trustworthiness) and other agents’ actions as 
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providers. As a result, the transition between two states is not deterministic because of 
those uncertainties.  
In this situation, the objective of CoCoAgents is to determine the best action set 
(i.e., strategy) for requesting information which maximizes the utility gained to reach the 
destination state (i.e., empty information requirements). 
In order to address the problem, the following section introduces an overview of 
stochastic game theory and shows how a stochastic game is deployed for CoCoAgents. 
 
4.4 MODELING THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AS A STOCHASTIC GAME 
A stochastic game [Shapley 1953a; Bowling and Veloso 2000; Hu and Wellman 
2003] is a tuple (S, A1, … ,An, u1, … , un, p), where S is the state space. Ai is the action 
space for player I, n is the number of players, ui: S × A1 × … × An → R is the reward 
function of player i. p: S × A1 × … × An → ∆(S) is the transition probability, where ∆(S) 
represents the set of probability distribution over S and p satisfies the condition: 
1
'
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At a state s ∈ S, each agent selects actions a1, …, an, and receives rewards 
ui(s,a1,…,an), and makes a transition to s′ ∈ S depending on the transition probability.  
The objective of each agent is to find an action strategy which maximizes the discounted 
sum of rewards represented by vi, where πi is the action strategy of player i, β ∈[0,1) is a 
discount factor, uit is a reward for player i at time t, and s0 is an initial state. 
1 1 0
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In information sharing networks, each state is represented by the information 
requirements, and the rewards are defined in terms of the coverage of information 
requirements [Barber and Park 2003] attained by taking an action for information 
request and corresponding reception of the necessary information. Each agent’s action 
space consists of two separate spaces: actions for information request as an information 
consumer and actions for information supply as an information provider. Accordingly, 
the action space for each agent can be represented by Ai = Aiprov × Aicons, where Aiprov is 
the action space consisting of the available actions as an information provider, and Aicons 
is the action space with available actions as an information consumer. The joint action 
space A = A1prov × A1cons ×…× Anprov × Ancons can be decomposed into 2 terms based on 
agents’ roles and correspondence. From an information consumer’s perspective, the 
actions to be taken into account by agent i for calculating rewards are its actions for 
requesting information and the corresponding actions of other agents as providers 
(Equation 1). The action space as an information provider (Equation 2) consists of an 
agent’s actions for responding to other agents’ requests and corresponding request actions 
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Equation 2 Information Provider’s Actions and Corresponding Action of Consumers 
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The rationale for decomposing the action space into multiple types based on roles 
is that each dimension contributes to the expected reward in different ways. However, 
since they are not completely independent, the effect of one action type on the other also 
needs to be considered. The following sections present detail about modeling action 
spaces and strategy selection for an information consumer and an information provider. 
 
4.5 APPROACH 
This section describes information sharing strategies. The strategy for information 
consumer agents is presented in the following sub-section, followed by the strategy for 
information provider agents.  
 
4.5.1 Strategy for Information Consumer Agents 
An agent i has a set of information requirements RQ(ai) = {rk} and a set of 
available information PR(ai) = {rp} for other agents and itself. The state of an agent is 
represented by the information requirements. The action space at a given state is 
dependent on the current information requirements and the available information 
providers. The reward from actions at a given state is calculated by the coverage, and the 
expected reward for reaching the final state (i.e., no more information requirements) is 
adjusted by the total cost and the trustworthiness of the gathered information; the 
coverage is the percentage of information requirements satisfied by the actions, the 
trustworthiness measures the consistency and accuracy of the provided information, and 
the cost is represented by message complexity (i.e., number of messages). It is assumed 
that once an agent reaches the final state, the state is reset to the initial state infinitely. In 
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other words, infinite interactions are assumed in the way that there is a transition with no 
additional rewards or cost from the final state to the initial state. 
Available actions for an information consumer are a set of requests to a subset of 
available information providers. When interacting agents commit actions, the information 
requirements for an information requester can therefore change, and the requester’s state 
transits to the next state. In the next state, due to the change in information requirements, 
available action sets are different from the previous state unless the agent stays in the 
same state with the previous one. Therefore, at each state agents play different games, 
which make the deployment of a stochastic game the most appropriate for information 
sharing networks. The strategy for this stochastic game is stationary, and in a stochastic 
game with stationary strategies there exists at least one Nash Equilibrium point [Nash 
1950; Nash 1951], where the strategies in Nash Equilibrium are defined as a tuple of 
strategies (π1*,…, πn*) such that for all s ∈ S and i=1,…,n, 
* * * * * *
1 1 1 1( , ,..., ) ( , ,..., , , ,..., ),i n i i i i n iv s v sπ π π π π π π π− +≥ ∀  
In Nash Equilibrium, each agent cannot be better off by deviating from the current 
strategy without any change in other agents’ strategy [Nash 1950; Nash 1951]. Also, an 
agent’s strategy is the best response to others’ strategies in Nash Equilibrium, where the 
best response is the strategy which results in the most favorable immediate outcome for 
the current player, given others’ strategies.   
This research experimentally shows how agents reach the equilibrium by finding 
the best response given the action spaces, reward structure, and observations about other 
agents. 
Agent i’s consumer action aicons={requesti(j, rk)} denotes that agent i requests 
information element k from agent j. The requests have to satisfy the constraints that all 
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the required information elements are requested and each element can be requested from 
a single information provider. The strategy of agent i for requesting information, π-ini, is 
a path of actions which maximize the discounted sum of rewards (Equation 3) when the 
other agents have the strategy π-out, for providing information. π-out-i in Equation 3 
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Equation 3 Discounted Reward Sum 
From the information consumer agents’ point of view, the information providers’ 
actions for their own requests are recognized as being comprised of either to provide 
(providej(rk, i)) or not to provide the requested information (¬providej(rk, i)). The set of 
actions by both providers and a consumer lead a static state transition to a certain state 
with a probability of 1.0, but since the probability of actions being committed by 
providers can vary depending on the providers’ strategy, rewards are scaled by RR(i, j). 
In other words, expected rewards are obtained by taking into account the coverage for a 
pair of requesting strategy and responding strategy and the probability of the pair of 
strategies to actually occur. The trustworthiness of the information elements is also 
incorporated into the expected rewards. The trustworthiness of an information provider 
agent is established by building a statistical error model of the information provider agent 
(see Chapter 3). As a result, for a transition from a state to another state by a consumer’s 
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Equation 4 Expected Reward 





∏  is the product of the probabilities each provider commits a provider action as 
a response to a consumer’s action Aicons. In a competitive environment, it is not assumed 
that an agent knows the exact model of other agents’ actions and the selection of the best 
response. Thus, an agent maintains an estimated probabilistic model of other agents’ 
actions by observation. The reception rate, RR(i, j) (∈[0,1]), is the probability of j 
replying to i’s requests and can be calculated by counting the number of requests replied 
by agent j.  
In order to take into account the cost incurred during the interactions, discounted 
reward sum vi is scaled by the total cost. Therefore, the objective function a consumer 
agent needs to maximize becomes as in Equation 5, where cost(π-ini, π-out-i) is the cost 
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Equation 5 Discounted Reward Sum with Cost 
The opponent modeling Q-learning method [Uther and Veloso 2003] takes a 
similar approach for building a model of other agents’ actions and calculating the 
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expected rewards. The opponent modeling Q-learning constructs a table of probabilities 
that other agents take certain actions at a given state and the expected rewards are scaled 
by the probability so that an agent can calculate the best action. 
Figure 11 shows an example of agent 0’s state transition graph as a stochastic 
game. Agent 0 has a set of information requirements RQ(a0)={r1, r2, r3}.  
 
 
Figure 11 CoCoAgent’s Stochastic Game Modeling of Consumer Strategy with Information 
Requirement {r1, r2, r3} 
 There are 8 states, including the initial and final state. There can be a loop to each 
state but the loops are pruned to reduce the computational complexity, because loops to 
each state do not contribute to expected rewards with no coverage increase. A state 
transition to another state can be triggered by different combinations of consumer actions 
and provider actions. For example, assuming each information element from RQ(a0) can 
be provided by 2 different provider agents, 8 different combinations of consumer and 
provider actions can cause a transition from state A to state B. Supposing that there are 3 
other agents – agent 1, agent 2, and agent 3 – which can provide the required information 
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PR(a1)={r1, r2}, PR(a2)={r2, r3}, PR(a3)={r1, r3}, the available actions for agent 0 
(Ai,jcons, where j is an index of an action) at the initial state A are: 
 
0,0 0 1 0 2 0 3
0,1 0 1 0 2 0 3
0,2 0 1 0 2 0 3
0,3 0 1 0
{ (1, ), (2, ), (3, )}
{ (1, ), (2, ), (2, )}
{ (1, ), (1, ), (3, )}





A request r request r request r
A request r request r request r
A request r request r request r




= 2 0 3
0,4 0 1 0 2 0 3
0,5 0 1 0 2 0 3
0,6 0 1 0 2 0 3
0,7
, ), (2, )}
{ (3, ), (2, ), (3, )}
{ (3, ), (2, ), (2, )}
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For A0,0cons at state A, the other agents’ actions A-0prov = {¬provide1(r1, 0), 
¬provide2(r2, 0), provide3(r3, 0)} lead agent 0 to state B. The reward for the action set 
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At state B, agent 0’s possible actions A0cons are as follows: 
 
0,0 0 1 0 2
0,1 0 1 0 2
0,2 0 1 0 2
0,3 0 1 0 2
{ (1, ), (2, )}
{ (1, ), (1, )}
{ (3, ), (2, )}





A request r request r
A request r request r
A request r request r







If corresponding responses for A0,0cons from provider agents are A-0prov = 
{provide1(r1, 0), provide2(r2, 0) }, the next state of state B is H which is the final state 
satisfying the information requirements of agent 0. Accordingly, the reward for the action 
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As a result, the discounted reward sum for the above actions yielding transitions 
from A to B and B to H is: 
0 A B B Hv E Eβ− −= +  
, and the scaled discounted reward sum is: 
0 ( )B HA Bv E E costβ −−= + ∑  
Agent 0’s objective is to find the strategy for requesting information such that the 
scaled discounted reward sum is maximized among all possible combinations of actions 
for all possible paths from the initial (or current) state to the final state. Formally, agent 
0’s best strategy for requesting information is decide by finding π*-in0 such that: 
0
*
0 0 0 0arg max ( , , )
in
in v s in out
π
π π π −
−
− = − −  
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4.5.2 Strategy for Information Provider Agents 
CoCoAgents maintain the degree of collaboration for making decision on the 
actions as provider agents. 
The strategy of the information provider agents, denoted by π-out, indirectly 
affects the expected rewards by potentially affecting the other agents’ responses, thus the 
expected rewards. Therefore, the information provider agents’ strategy aims to adjust the 
degree of collaboration with other agents so that collaborative relationships can be built 
among the complementary and trustworthy agents. The collaborative relationships by 
adapting the degree of collaboration can help CoCoAgents avoid both (1) being exploited 
by other agents and (2) being isolated from other agents when the agents still need other 
agents’ help. The degree of collaboration carries the agent’s amount of intention for 
collaboration with each agent. CoCoAgent i’s degree of collaboration with agent j is 
denoted by doc(i, j) and is modeled as a probability distribution of responses to requests 
from other agents. Therefore, CoCoAgents as information providers make stochastic 
decisions about whether to reply or not according to the degree of collaboration.  
The reception rate (RR) is an estimated model of other agents’ degree of 
collaboration. CoCoAgents build the reception rate model based on the observed actions 
of the interacting agents, and use the reception rate as the factor for determining the 
value of their own degree of collaboration with other agents. Algorithm 4 shows the 
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Algorithm 4 Adaptive Degree of Collaboration 
The degree of collaboration with a provider agent is updated at each timestep. The 
direction of change in doc is determined based on the change of the reception rate (∆RR). 
If the reception rate from a provider agent has increased from the previous timestep 
(∆RR>0), the degree of collaboration with the provider also increases. On the other hand, 
if the reception rate from a provider agent has decreased from the previous step (∆RR<0), 
the degree of collaboration with the provider decreases. The amount of change in doc is 
determined based on the previous doc and the incremental coefficient α. The amount of 
change is a second order polynomial function of the previous degree of collaboration 
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(doct-1), and has the maximum value 0.25α when doct-1 is the center value (0.5) between 
the maximum (1.0) and minimum (0.0) value (Figure 12). The amount of change as the 
second order polynomial function aids the convergence of the degree of collaboration 
and prevents any significant fluctuation. The degree of collaboration near 0.5 can 
generally be considered as containing the highest uncertainty.  
According to Figure 12, the amount of change in CoCoAgent’s degree of 
collaboration is relatively high when the previous degree of collaboration is close to 0.5, 
accelerating the escape from the most uncertain state. On the other hand, because of the 
relatively small amount of change near the maximum or minimum value, it takes more 
iteration of counteractions for CoCoAgent to change the relationships. For example, the 
degree of collaboration near 0.5 can quickly converge to either close to the maximum or 
minimum value, while the degree of collaboration near maximum does not easily diverge 
to the other end (i.e., minimum doc) without a series of decreases in the reception rate. In 
other words, the proposed algorithm for adapting the degree of collaboration leverages 
the construction of collaborative relations or non-collaborative relations by accelerating 
the change of doc near unstable relationships (i.e., doc is near 0.5) and decelerating the 
change of doc in relatively stable relationships (i.e., doc is near 1.0 or 0.0). 

















Figure 12 Incremental Value for Degree of Collaboration 
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Since the reception rate can be updated by making information requests and 
counting the number of replied requests, the reception rate does not change (i.e., ∆RR=0) 
if there have been no requests made in the previous timestep. Keeping the degree of 
collaboration with the non-interacting agents as the same value can let CoCoAgents 
confront the possibility of being exploited by other agents. In order to prevent 
CoCoAgents from being exploited by providing requested information without requesting 
information from other agents, the degree of collaboration with non-interacting agents is 
decayed by decay rate δ. Decaying the degree of collaboration with non-interacting 
agents aids in avoiding the exploitation as well as building strong collaborative 
relationships with interacting agents. In order to minimize the effect of temporal decay 
and let the degree of collaboration depend more on direct interaction, the decay rate is 








adaptive degree of collaboration
∆RR  > 0
















Figure 13 Adaptation of Degree of Collaboration 
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Figure 13 shows how the degree of collaboration changes depending on the 
previous value when the reception rate has been changed from the previous timestep. In 
the figure, when ∆RR>0, doc value increases along the curve above doct = doct-1. For 
example, if doct-1 is at point A, an increase of the reception rate shifts doct to point B. 
Another increase of the reception rate makes the degree of collaboration (doct) move to 
point C. In the same way, when ∆RR>0, doc value decreases along the curve below doct 
= doct-1. For example, if doct-1 is at point D, a decrease of the reception rate shifts doct to 
point E, and another increase of the reception rate in the next timestep leads the degree of 
collaboration (doct) to point F. 
 
4.5.3 Emergence of Collaboration 
In game theory, the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) refers to general-sum games where 
two players try to receive the higher rewards by choosing an action between cooperate 
and defect. In a non-iterated PD, defect by both players is a Nash Equilibrium point 
though it is not a Pareto-Optimal solution. In the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD), Tit-
For-Tat [Axlerod 1984] has been the most effective strategy to achieve the maximum 
rewards. Tit-For-Tat is to cooperate until the opponent defects. When the opponent 
defects, the player punishes the opponent by selecting defect. A Tit-For-Tat strategy is a 
cooperative approach and the success of the strategy has provided the foundation for the 
explanation of the emergence of cooperation in human society, in a group of animals, or 
in politics [Axlerod 1984]. 
The similarity between Tit-For-Tat and the adaptive degree of collaboration 
provided in the previous section can be found by investigating a matrix game which can 
be observed in a state between two agents. Once two agents are assumed to be partially or 
completely complementary, and both agents request information from each other, the 
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reward matrix for agent 1 (player 1) can be represented as in Table 2. Note that since the 
requirements and requests change depending on the previous actions, the agents play 
different games in each state. However, the reward structure observed in each game 
provides intuition on how collaboration can emerge in information sharing networks. 
 
Table 2 Player 1’s Reward Structure 
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As can be seen in Table 2, the game is basically a Prisoner’s Dilemma when 
considering the four extreme cases (doc = 1 and doc = 0 for each agent). E(u1) is the 
expected payoff represented by the product of attained coverage, the probability of 
achieving the coverage, and the trustworthiness of agent 2. costc is the cost of requesting 
and receiving information, and costp is the cost for providing requested information. The 
difference between traditional PD and the game in the information sharing networks is 
that the action space for the degree of collaboration is continuous. The adaptation of the 
degree of collaboration in the previous section is performed in a similar way to Tit-For-
Tat. When the opponent has been a collaborative provider (i.e., increasing RR), the 
degree of collaboration is kept higher while the degree of collaboration for the opponent 
decreases if the opponent tends to be a non-cooperative provider. It is also noteworthy 
that the degree of collaboration with non-interacting agents decays over time. Among 
CoCoAgents, the emergence of collaboration can be observed because CoCoAgents are 
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rational and pursue the reward maximization. Among heterogeneous agents, including 




The objective of each agent is to maximize the information acquisition utility by 
constructing appropriate relationships with other agents. The agents equipped with 
information sharing strategies are called CoCoAgents (Competitive Collaborating 
Agents). The information sharing strategies for CoCoAgents consist of two types of 
strategies. The first strategy is for the information consumer’s role. The strategy as an 
information consumer is to decide from which information providers to request which 
information requirements. In order to take into account the previous interaction history 
and expected rewards in the future, stochastic games are deployed to represent the 
decision process. In the stochastic game model, the request strategy which maximizes the 
expected rewards is selected. Expected rewards are calculated using the model of other 
agents’ degree of collaboration, the trustworthiness of the other agents, and the cost of 
information acquisition.  
The strategy as an information provider is to determine the degree of 
collaboration with other agents. The degree of collaboration is adapted using the model of 
other agents’ degree of collaboration which can be built based on the observations of 
interactions with other agents. The adaptive degree of collaboration is a variation of Tit-
For-Tat from the Iterative Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) problem in a continuous action 
space. The adaptive degree of collaboration starts from a high degree of collaboration 
with others. If an agent detects the decrease of other agents’ degree of collaboration, the 
agent decreases the degree of collaboration with those agents. If an agent detects the 
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increase of other agents’ degree of collaboration, the agent increases the degree of 
collaboration with those agents. If an agent decides not to request information from 
particular agents (called non-interacting agents), the degree of collaboration with those 
non-interacting agents decays over time. 
 
 
Figure 14 Strategies for Information Providers and Consumers 
The overall process for determining information sharing strategies can be depicted 
as in Figure 14. In the figure, CoCoAgents model the other agents’ degree of 
collaboration as ReceptionRate by observation, and the ReceptionRate affects the 
adaptation of the degree of collaboration and expected utility of the information request 
strategy, along with trustworthiness evaluation and cost. The expected utility affects the 
strategy for information requests. The iterative interactions between agents help to build 





This chapter presents the experimental results to show how the proposed 
algorithms improve the performance of agents in information sharing networks. Partner 
selection algorithms are covered in Section 5.1, and the algorithms for collaboration are 
presented in Section 5.2. 
 
5.1 PARTNER SELECTION 
This section presents the experimental results of partner selection algorithms in 
order to address Research Question 1 (RQ1). 
 RQ1. How do information consumer agents select the most appropriate 
information providers so that information acquisition utility can be maximized?   
The first set of experiments (Exp 1.1) shows the effect of each evaluation metric 
on the information acquisition utility. The experiments validate the introduction of each 
metric by comparing the accomplished information acquisition utility with the utility 
when each metric is omitted. 
The objective of the second set of experiments (Exp 1.2) is to show how the 
information acquisition utility is affected by the presence of inaccurate information 
providers. In the experiments, a consumer agent selects a set of providers satisfying its 
information requirements based on trustworthiness evaluation. The experiment varies the 
percentage of information providers providing inaccurate information, and compares the 
quality of acquired information for different schemes. 
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The third set of experiments (Exp 1.3) aims to show how the information 
acquisition utility is affected by the amount of effort an agent spends building its trust 
model of others in the initial stage of interactions. An information consumer is allowed to 
request information from all available providers for a specified period of time (trust 
bootstrap time) and use the acquired information for building the initial trustworthiness 
values. Ideally, if an information consumer agent is allowed more time, the consumer 
agents can gather more evidence, thus build more accurate models of trustworthiness. 
The experiments (Exp 1.3) investigate how the quality of information and runtime are 
affected for different trust bootstrap times.    
The last set of experiments (Exp 1.4 – Exp 1.7) addresses the performance of the 
proposed heuristic search techniques used to find information providers. Each technique 
is evaluated in terms of the resulting quality of the acquired information in the presence 
of inaccurate information providers. Exp 1.4 shows how the quality of information is 
affected by the time allowed for traversing the search space between each round of 
information requests. Exp 1.5 and Exp 1.6 take into account the number of information 
requirements and the number of information providers respectively in the resulting 
quality of information. Exp 1.7 considers the effect of the number of information 
providers per each information requirement and the resulting impact on the quality of 
acquired information.    
The following section presents the experimental setups for addressing each 
question, and shows the results of each experiment. 
 
5.1.1 Experiment Setups and Results 
Table 3 shows the experiment setups for Exp 1.1. In the experiments, a consumer 
agent can select an information provider per its information requirement. In the table, 
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Number of Providers is the number of information providing agents, and Number of 
Requirements is the number of information elements required by a consumer agent. 
Each information provider agent is randomly assigned available information elements, 
and the number of available information elements per each provider is also randomly 
assigned, but all the information requirements are covered by the union of information 
providers’ available information elements. Number of Timesteps is the maximum 
number of timesteps in each experiment, and Number of Runs is the number of 
experiment runs. TRUST_BOOTSTRAP_TS is the number of timesteps allowed for 
each consumer agent to build its initial trust model of information providers.  
During TRUST_BOOTSTRAP_TS, an information consumer agent requests 
information elements from all available providers, and builds its trustworthiness 
evaluation based on the received information. Cost Assignment represents the range of 
cost values and how the cost of information acquisition is defined. Each provider is 
randomly assigned a value from [1, 1.2]. Since the cost of a single provider selection per 
an information requirement does not impose a large amount of cost difference, as 
opposed to multiple provider selection per information requirement, a small amount of 
variation ([0, 0.2]) is randomly added to a unit cost (1.0) per information provider. % 
Providers with errors represents the portion of information providers who deliver 
inaccurate information. Information provider agents providing inaccurate information are 
randomly selected and provide the information with error mean and error variance 
proportional to an agent’s id (Error (mean, variance) in the table). The error mean and 
error variance values range from [0,1], and the agent with id n has error (mean, variance) 
of (n / Number of Providers, n / Number of Providers). Therefore, agents with a high id 
number provide more inaccurate and inconsistent information.  
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Under the Cases parameter, four different schemes are compared with respect to 
the performance metrics. In each scheme, TrustEval represents the use of 
trustworthiness evaluation based on previous interaction. FC represents a full coverage of 
the information requirements. When a full coverage is guaranteed, the combinations of 
information providers which can satisfy the information requirements are only included 
as the potential combinations of information providers. Cost represents the consideration 
of cost factor in the information acquisition utility. Consequently, TrustEvalFCCost is a 
scheme with trustworthiness, coverage, and cost incorporated into the expected reward 
calculation. RandomFCCost guarantees a full coverage of the information requirements 
and considers cost factor, but trustworthiness evaluation is not conducted. 
TrustEvalCost considers trustworthiness and cost for expected rewards, but does not 
guarantee the full coverage of the information requirements. TrustEvalFC considers 
only the trustworthiness and guarantees the full coverage of the information 
requirements.  
In Performance measures, MSE (mean square error) of the received information 
compared to the true value is used for quality metric, and the Average Coverage and 
Average Cost represent the average coverage and average cost at each timestep 
respectively. Information Acquisition Utility represents the accomplished information 
acquisition utility accumulated over the specified timesteps. Since an information 
consumer agent selects the information providers based on the expected value of the 
information acquisition utility, the reciprocal value of MSE is used for the calculation of 






Table 3 Experiment Setups for Exp 1.1 
Parameters Exp 1.1 
Number of Providers 30 
Number of Requirements 
per Consumer Agent 10 
Number of Timesteps 100 
Number of Runs 10 
TRUST_BOOTSTRAP_TS 20 
Cost Assignment Random [1, 1.2] 
% Providers with errors 100 










Information Acquisition Utility 
 
 







Figure 15 MSE in Exp 1.1 
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 Figure 15 shows the MSE of the received information for each scheme. Without 
the trustworthiness evaluation (RandomFCCost), higher MSE results while other schemes 
(TrustEvalFC, TrustEvalCost, TrustEvalFCCost) result in less MSE. The differences 
between the schemes which use the trustworthiness evaluation are not statistically 
significant. This experiment explains the necessity of the trustworthiness evaluation for 
the quality improvement of the received information.  
 







Figure 16 Average Coverage in Exp 1.1 
 
  







Figure 17 Average Cost in Exp 1.1 
 
 Figure 16 and Figure 17 show the effect of incorporating the coverage and the 
cost into the expected reward. Considering the trustworthiness and cost may decrease the 
error and the cost for acquiring the necessary information (TrustEvalCost in Figure 15 
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and Figure 17), but this does not help satisfy the information requirements (Figure 16). 
Similarly, considering the trustworthiness and coverage may decrease the error and 
increase the coverage (TrustEvalFC in Figure 15 and Figure 17), but does not help reduce 
the information acquisition cost (Figure 16).  
 







Figure 18 Information Acquisition Utility in Exp 1.1 
 
The information acquisition utility can be maximized when an information 
consumer agent considers the three evaluation metrics together, as in Figure 18. In the 
figure, TrustEvalFCCost results in the highest information acquisition utility, even if each 
metric may not be maximized (coverage), or minimized (MSE, cost). Consequently, an 
information consumer agent can maximize the subsequent goal achievability by 
maximizing the information acquisition utility.  
The following experiments take a closer look at the effect of trustworthiness on 
the information acquisition utility by considering the sets of information providers 





Table 4 Experiment Setups for Exp 1.2 and Exp 1.3 
Parameters Exp 1.2 Exp 1.3 
Number of Providers 100 {20, 40, 80} 
Number of Requirements 
per Consumer Agent 30 5 
Number of Timesteps 500 500 
Number of Runs 10 10 
TRUST_BOOTSTRAP_TS 10 {1, 20 40, 60, 80, 100, 120, 140, 160}
% Providers with errors {1, 20, 40, 60, 80, 100} 100 
Error (mean, variance) 
(agent id / Number of 
Providers, agent id / 
Number of Providers) 
(agent id / Number of Providers,  






Performance Measure MSE MSE Runtime (ms) 
 
Table 4 shows the experiment setups for Exp 1.2 and Exp 1.3. In the experiments, 
a consumer agent can select an information provider per its information requirement. In 
the table, Cases represent the information consumer agent’s partner selection schemes. In 
TrustKnownFCEval, an information consumer agent has access to global knowledge 
about the information providers’ trustworthiness. In other words, the accurate error 
distribution of each information provider is known to each information consumer agent. 
Therefore, information consumer agents can select the best information providers. In 
TrustEvalFCCost, an information consumer agent evaluates the trustworthiness of the 
information providers based on the initial bootstrap interactions and the following 
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interactions with selected information providers. The evaluated trustworthiness is used 
for selecting appropriate information providers. In RandomFCCost, an information 
consumer agent selects random information providers, which results in full coverage of 
information requirements. Therefore, while an information consumer agent does not take 
into account the quality of information, it can acquire all the required information 
elements. In Exp 1.2, Mean-Square-Error (MSE) of the acquired information is used to 
evaluate the performance of the algorithms. Runtime represents the computational 
burden of the consumer agent (Exp 1.3), and is measured in millisecond in the 
experiment.    
 















Figure 19 Mean Square Errors versus Percentage of Erroneous Information Providers (Exp 1.2) 
Figure 19 shows the results of Exp 1.2. Since an information consumer agent 
knows which information provider agents are the best to cover all the information 
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requirements in TrustKnownFCCost, TrustKnownFCCost results show the best 
“optimal” performance, and the MSE increases only as the percentage of erroneous 
information providers increases. When an information consumer agent does not have 
global knowledge about the trustworthiness of the information provider agents (which is 
usually the case in multi-agent systems), TrustEvalFCCost shows comparable results to 
TrustKnownFCCost, while random selections (RandomFCCost) result in higher errors. 
In summary, Exp 1.2 shows that the trustworthiness evaluation significantly improves the 
quality of received information in the presence of inaccurate information providers, thus 
increasing the information acquisition utility.  
 

















Figure 20 Mean Square Errors versus Trust Bootstrap Time (Exp 1.3) 
Figure 20 shows the results from Exp 1.3. The figure shows the MSE for different 
quantities of information provider agents as the trust bootstrap time grows. As more time 
for trust bootstrap is allowed, the MSE decreases because an information consumer agent 
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has more time to build more accurate models of trustworthiness. The MSE decreases as 
the number of available information providers increases, since the information consumer 
agent has more options for information provider selection, with higher trustworthiness as 
the number of information providers increases according to the experiment setup.  
 
























Figure 21 Runtime versus Trust Bootstrap Time (Exp 1.3) 
Although allowing more time for agents to build their trust models of potential 
information providers (more TRUST_BOOTSTRAP_TS) results in less error in acquired 
information, more time for trust bootstrap results in an increase in runtime. During the 
TRUST_BOOTSTRAP_TS, an information consumer agent makes information requests 
from all available information providers and builds a trustworthiness model based on the 
obtained information during bootstrap time. As a result, more trust bootstrap time implies 
the increase of information a consumer agent has to deal with and communicate, leading 
to the increase of runtime as in Figure 21. 
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In summary, Exp 1.3 shows that more time for agents to build their trust models 
of potential information providers improves the quality of acquired information, while 
more runtime is spent for initial interactions and computations.  
Table 5 Experiment Setups for Exp 1.4, Exp 1.5, Exp 1.6, and Exp 1.7 
Parameters Exp 1.4 Exp 1.5 Exp 1.6 Exp 1.7 
Number of Providers 5 5 {3, 4, 5, 6} 5 
Number of Requirements 3 {2, 3, 4, 5} 3 3 
Number of Timesteps 128 128 128 128 
Number of Runs 10 10 10 10 
Num of Prov/Req 3 3 3 {2, 3, 4, 5}


















Performance Measure MSE MSE MSE MSE 
Table 5 presents the setup for experiments aiming to show the performance of the 
proposed heuristic search techniques. While the previous experiments assume a single 
provider selection per information requirement, multiple providers can be selected per 
information requirement by an information consumer for these experiments. Num of 
Prov/Req represents the number of available information providers per information 
requirement. In the experiments, information requests are assumed to be made in each 
round, and multiple timesteps can comprise a round. In every round, an information 
consumer agent can perform a search operation for finding the best information providers 
to satisfy its information requirements for the specified amount of timesteps. Num 
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TS/Round represents the number of timesteps per round, and an information consumer 
agent can perform its search operation for Num TS/Round timesteps before making 
information requests. Cases represent heuristic search techniques to be compared (HC: 
Hill-Climbing, HCSI: Hill-Climbing wit Source Inversion, HCCI: Hill-Climbing with 
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Figure 22 Mean Square Errors versus Timestep per Round (Exp 1.4) 
In the results of Exp 1.4 (Figure 22), the proposed heuristic search techniques 
decrease the MSE of the received information as more time for the search is allocated. 
While HCRM does not result in the improvement of traditional HC method, HCSI and 
HCCI show the improvement in the quality of obtained information. Particularly, the 
performance of HCSI and HCCI shows more enhancement when a smaller number of 
timesteps constitute a round, meaning when less time is allowed for traversing search 
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space. The results imply that the MUTATION operations help avoid the search from 
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Figure 23 Mean Square Errors versus Number of Information Requirements (Exp 1.5) 
Figure 23 shows the performance of the heuristic search techniques for different 
numbers of information requirements. The search space size increases exponentially as 
the number of requirements increases. For example, when the number of information 
requirements is 2 in Figure 23, the number of possible combinations of information 
providers is 49, while the number becomes 16,807 with 5 information requirements. The 
increase of search space size implies the increase in MSE given a fixed amount of time 
for the search as shown in the figure. In this experiment, HC and HCRM show similar 
performance in terms of MSE, while HCSI and HCCI do better in finding information 
providers with less error with a fixed amount of search time (Num TS/Round). As in the 
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previous experiments, the results imply that the MUTATION operations help prevent the 
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Figure 24 Mean Square Errors versus Number of Information Providers (Exp 1.6) 
Figure 24 shows the result of Exp 1.6 with MSE versus the number of information 
providers. In this experiment, the result does not show any trends in MSE depending on 
the number of information providers given a fixed number of information requirements 
and the number of providers per information requirement. This result implies that if the 
provider combinations which can result in a full coverage of consumer’s information 
requirements only are examined, the total number of providers does not affect the amount 
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Figure 25 Mean Square Errors versus Number of Information Providers per Information 
Requirement (Exp 1.7) 
Figure 25 shows the graph of MSE versus the number of information providers 
per information requirement from Exp 1.7. As the number of available information 
providers increases, the available options for an information consumer agent’s selection 
of information providers increase, leading to the expansion of search space. The figure 
shows that HC and HCRM cannot be delineated in terms of performance, while HCSI 
and HCCI show the reduction of error. This result implies that the search space size is 
dependent on the number of providers per information requirement and the search can be 
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Figure 26 Average Mean Square Errors 
Figure 26 presents the average mean square errors for each experiment to 
compare the performance of each heuristic search technique in general. HCCI shows the 
least amount of MSE, and HCSI shows less MSE than HC and HCRM, while HC and 
HCRM do not show any statistically significant difference in the performance. 
In addition to the dependence of search performance on different parameters, the 
following observations are made from the experiment results (Exp 1.4 – Exp 1.7): 
 Examining completely different combinations of information providers with 
hill-climbing (HCCI) helps the search quickly escape from local optima or 
plateau. 
 Examining close neighbors with hill-climbing (HCSI) helps escape from local 
optima or plateau, but is not as effective as HCCI. 
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 Examining random nodes with hill-climbing (HCRM) does not contribute to 
escaping from local optima or plateau. 
 
5.2 COLLABORATION AMONG AGENTS 
This section presents the experimental results for CoCoAgents’ strategies as an 
information consumer and information provider for Research Question 2 (RQ2) in 
Chapter 1.  
 RQ2. How should an agent interact with other agents for sharing information in 
competitive environments? 
The first set of experiments (Exp 2.1) aims to show that the proposed information 
sharing strategies lead CoCoAgents to build collaborative relationships with 
complementary agents. To show how the agents’ requests and supply of information 
elements are affected by the complementary relationships, uncertainty in the quality of 
information is not considered in this experiment. In addition, how the emerging 
relationships contribute to the information acquisition is addressed. 
The objective of the second set of experiments (Exp 2.2) is to justify the 
incorporation of the model of other agents’ degree of collaboration (i.e., ReceptionRate) 
and trustworthiness into a CoCoAgent’s decision-making process. In this experiment, the 
effect of ReceptionRate on the efficiency of information acquisition and the effect of 
trustworthiness on the quality of information are investigated. 
The last set of experiments (Exp 2.3) addresses the performance of CoCoAgents 
in heterogeneous environments where selfish agents reside. This experiment shows how 
the adaptation of the degree of collaboration contributes to CoCoAgents’ construction of 
appropriate relationships with other agents. Especially, how decaying the degree of 
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collaboration with non-interacting agents helps build appropriate collaborative 
relationships is investigated. 
 
5.2.1 Experiment Setups and Results 
In the experiments, each agent has a set of information requirements and a set of 
available information elements. The quality of available information elements offered by 
a respective information provider, which is not known to the other agents, is denoted by a 
Gaussian distribution of errors in the information. The complementary relationships 
between agents are divided into “completely complementary (CC)” and “partially 
complementary (PC)” relationships. Two agents (ai, aj) are completely complementary 
when each agent can provide all the required information of the other agent (RQ(ai) ⊂ 
PR(aj) ∧ RQ(aj) ⊂ PR(ai)) , while s partially complementary relationship is formed when 
each agent can provide only a subset of the other agent’s required information (RQ(ai) ∩ 
PR(aj) ≠ ∅ ∧ RQ(aj) ∩ PR(ai) ≠ ∅ ∧ RQ(ai) ⊄ PR(aj) ∧ RQ(aj) ⊄ PR(ai)). Figure 27 
shows how agents and their complementary relationships are depicted. In the figure, a set 
of information elements on an incoming arrow represents the information requirements 
(ri, rj) which need to be satisfied by other agents. The information elements on an 
outgoing arrow are a set of available information elements to other agents (rk, rl). Error in 
available information is modeled in a Gaussian distribution N(µ, σ) where µ is the mean 




Figure 27 Visualization of Agents and Relationships 
Three different configurations of agents are used to set up the complementary 
relationships among agents. Each configuration has sub-configurations with different 
allocation of available information quality. Figure 28 shows the configuration of agents 
where 3 agents, each with 2 information requirements and 2 available information 
elements, are deployed (ST1). Each agent is partially complementary with the other 
agents. There is only one available provider for each information requirement of each 
agent. All information providers in this configuration offer accurate information elements 




Figure 28 Configuration of Three Agents with Partial Complementary Relationships (ST1) 
Table 6 Error Distribution for ST1 
 (u0,v0) (u1,v1) (u2,v2) 
ST1 (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) 
In the second configuration (ST2) in Figure 29, 3 agents, each with 2 information 
requirements and 2 available information elements, are deployed. The complementary 
relationships are asymmetric in this configuration, such that agent 0 and agent 1 are 
completely complementary, while agent 2 is partially complementary with agent 0 and 
agent 1. In this configuration, while agent 0 and agent 1 have 2 providers for one 
requirement and 1 provider for another requirement, agent 2 has only 1 available provider 
for each information requirement. For ST2, 6 different combinations of error distributions 




Figure 29 Configuration of Three Agents with Partial and Complete Complementary Relationships 
(ST2) 
Table 7 Error Distributions for ST2 
 (u0,v0) (u1,v1) (u2,v2) 
ST2-1 (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) 
ST2-2 (0,0) (0,0) (5,5) 
ST2-3 (0,0) (5,5) (0,0) 
ST2-4 (5,5) (0,0) (0,0) 
ST2-5 (5,5) (0,0) (5,5) 
ST2-6 (5,5) (5,5) (0,0) 
 
To deal with more complicated cases, the third configuration of agents (ST3) in 
Figure 30 deploys 4 agents, each with 2 information requirements and 2 available 
information requirements. In the configuration, completely complementary relationships 
are allocated between agent 0 and agent 3, and between agent 1 and agent 2. Each agent 
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is partially complementary with the other agents. Therefore, there are multiple providers 
for each information requirement. Depending on the assignments of error distributions, 8 
sub-configurations are provided, as in Table 8.  
 
 
Figure 30 Configuration of Four Agents with Partial and Complete Complementary Relationships 
(ST3) 
Table 8 Error Distributions for ST3 
 (u0,v0) (u1,v1) (u2,v2) (u3,v3) 
ST3-1 (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) 
ST3-2 (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (5,5) 
ST3-3 (0,0) (5,5) (5,5) (0,0) 
ST3-4 (0,0) (5,5) (0,0) (0,0) 
ST3-5 (5,5) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) 
ST3-6 (5,5) (0,0) (0,0) (5,5) 
ST3-7 (5,5) (5,5) (5,5) (0,0) 
ST3-8 (5,5) (5,5) (0,0) (0,0) 
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With the configurations of agents with different complementary relationships and 
error distributions, Table 9 provides experiment setups for Exp 2.1, Exp 2.2 and Exp 2.3. 
Table 9 Experiment Setups for Exp 2.1, Exp 2.2, and Exp 2.3 
Parameters Exp 2.1 Exp 2.2 Exp 2.3 




ST2-1 ~ ST2-6 
ST3-1 ~ ST3-8 ST3-1 
Participating Agents CoCoAgents CoCoAgents CoCoAgents Selfish Agent (a1) 
Number of Timesteps 200 200 {200, 400, 600, 800, 1000}
Number of Runs 100 100 100 
DoC incremental coeff α 0.1 0.1 0.1 
DoC decay rate δ 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Initial DoC 0.9 0.9 0.9 






ADoC with Decay 
ADoC with No Decay 







In Table 9, Configuration of Agents determines the number of agents, the 
number of information requirements, the number of available information elements, the 
complementary relationships among agents, and the error distribution of each agent. 
Participating Agent specifies the types of the deployed agents. Number of Timesteps 
decides the maximum number of timesteps, and Number of Runs denotes the number of 
experiment runs to be used for results. DoC incremental coeff α is the incremental 
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coefficient α which determines the amount of change in each trigger of the adaptation of 
the degree of collaboration as in Algorithm 4. DoC decay rate δ decides the decay speed 
of the degree of collaboration with non-interacting agents (i.e., agents the consumer agent 
does not request information from). Initial DoC is the initial value of the degree of 
collaboration.  
TRUST_BOOTSTRAP_TS is the number of timesteps used to build the initial 
model of other agents’ trustworthiness. Cases represents the algorithms used for 
performance comparison. TR_n_RR, TR, RR, and NoTR_n_NoRR are the variations of 
the proposed information request strategy as a information consumer. TR_n_RR is the 
default decision-making process using the proposed algorithm which considers the 
trustworthiness and ReceptionRate in estimating the expected rewards. TR and RR 
represent the use of trustworthiness or ReceptionRate exclusively in expected rewards 
calculation. With NoTR_n_NoRR, CoCoAgents do not use trustworthiness and 
ReceptionRate in expected rewards. As a result, NoTR_n_NoRR is basically a random 
selection.  
In Exp 2.1 and Exp 2.2, the strategy as an information provider is not altered, 
meaning the deployed CoCoAgents use the proposed adaptive degree of collaboration 
(Algorithm 4 in Chapter 4) to decide the information provider strategy. ADoC with 
Decay and ADoC with No Decay are the variations of information providers’ strategy. 
ADoC with No Decay does not decay the degree of collaboration with non-interacting 
agents (i.e., δ=1), while ADoC with Decay sets the decay rate δ to be less than 1. In Exp 
2.3, CoCoAgents’ information request strategy is controlled by the proposed algorithm 
with TR_n_RR. For Performance Measure, NumFinalStates represents the number 
reaching the final state from the initial state in the stochastic game representation (e.g., 
from A to H in Figure 11). In the final state, the information requirement is empty and the 
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final state transfers to the initial state without any cost. Therefore, NumFinalStates 
represents how many times the information requirements are fully satisfied (i.e., how 
many times all the requirements are obtained). NumMsg/TS represents the average 
number of messages an agent sends out in each timestep. In each timestep, a set of 
requests can be made and a set of replies can be received. The messages include the 
information requests and replies to other agents. DoC is the degree of collaboration, and 
MSE is the mean square error of acquired information elements.   
Figure 31, Figure 32, and Figure 33 show the final degree of collaboration from 
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Figure 31 Final degree of collaboration in ST1 
In Figure 31, each agent reciprocally reaches a high degree of collaboration with 
the other agents since both of the other agents are necessary to each agent in order to 
obtain the required information. Each agent’s degree of collaboration with itself is simply 
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Figure 32 Final degree of collaboration in ST2-1 
Figure 32 shows the final degrees of collaboration in the configuration ST2-1. 
Between completely complementary agents (agent 0 and agent 1), the degrees of 
collaboration become reciprocally high, building strong collaborative relationships while 
agent 0 and agent 1 have a low degree of collaboration with agent 2 which is partially 
complementary. In the initial stage of interactions, agent 0 can request information from 
agent 1 and agent 2. However, since agent 1 is completely complementary with agent 0, 
more requests and replies are exchanged between agent 0 and agent 1. As a result, the 
degree of collaboration between agent 0 and agent 1 converges to a high value faster than 
the degree of collaboration between agent 0 and agent 2, leading to a strong collaborative 
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Figure 33 Final degree of collaboration in ST3-1 
Figure 33 shows the final degrees of collaboration in the configuration ST3-1. It is 
observed that high degrees of collaboration result between completely complementary 
agents (agent 0−agent 3, agent 1−agent 2). While each agent mostly interacts with 
completely complementary agents, each agent’s degrees of collaboration with partially 
complementary agents are not minimal, as opposed to ST2-1 (i.e., agent 0 and agent 1 
still maintain weak collaborative relationships). In ST2-1, agent 0 must request 
information for one of its two information requirements from agent 1, but in ST3-1 each 
agent is not completely dependent on completely complementary agents. An agent can 
fully satisfy the information requirements even from partially complementary agents. 
Therefore, there is still a small amount of interactions between partially complementary 
agents, in the cases where an agent fails to receive information from the selected 
information providers.   
While the degree of collaboration represents the collaborative relationships 
between agents, the number of final states covered within a given timestep 
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(NumFinalStates) represents how efficiently each agent gets information requests 
satisfied.  
In summary, Exp2.1 shows that the information sharing strategies lead agents to 
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Figure 34 Number of Final States Covered after 200 Timesteps (ST1, ST2-1, ST3-1) 
Figure 34 shows the number of final states covered after 200 timesteps. Ideally, if 
an agent can obtain all the required information at each timestep, the maximum number 
of final states equals to the maximum number of timesteps in the experiment (which is 
200 in this case). In the figure, each agent in ST1 achieves the number of final states 
close to 200. In ST2-1, the number of final states for agent 0 and agent 1 reaches close to 
200, while agent 2 achieves around 75. In ST3-1, all agents achieve a high number of 
final states, which is close to 200. From all the results, it is observed that CoCoAgents 
tend to build collaborative relationships with completely complementary agents and 
achieve the satisfaction of information requests repeatedly.    
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In the following experiment results (Exp 2.2), the effect of ReceptionRate on the 
efficiency of information request strategy and the effect of trustworthiness evaluation on 
the quality of information are investigated. Figure 35 to Figure 40 are the results from 
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Figure 36 Number of Final States Covered after 200 Timesteps versus Agent Configuration (ST3) 
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Figure 35 and Figure 36 show the number of final states covered after 200 
timesteps for different configurations of agents and different variations of information 
request strategy. In Figure 35 (ST2), the number of final states is not affected by the 
information request strategy because the relationships are dominated by complementary 
relationships. On the other hand, depending on the evaluation metrics considered for 
information request strategy in ST3 (TR_n_RR, TR, RR, NoTR_n_NoRR), the efficiency 
of information acquisition changes as in Figure 36. The effect of ReceptionRate on the 
efficiency of information request can be discovered by comparing NoTR_n_NoRR with 
RR. By incorporating ReceptionRate (RR) in expected rewards calculation, CoCoAgents 
can achieve a higher number of final states than NoTR_n_NoRR.  
The number of final state using TR fluctuates without any trends because 
information providers who can provide a high quality of information are selected without 
considering whether they are willing to provide or not (TR in Figure 36). If 
ReceptionRate and trustworthiness are incorporated into expected rewards calculation 
together (TR_n_RR), the number of final states stays near RR but shows deviations in 
some cases because TR_n_RR pursues the maximization of expected rewards with 
combined metrics of trustworthiness, coverage, and cost along with RR. In summary, 
incorporating RR into the expected reward helps agents make requests to more 
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Figure 38 Number of Messages per Timestep versus Agent Configuration for (ST3) 
Similarly, the number of message per timestep is affected by ReceptionRate 
modeling. In Figure 37, the number of messages per timestep is not affected by 
information request strategies because the request strategy is dominated by 
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complementary relationships and the same information provider strategy is used for each 
case. Figure 38 shows similar patterns with that of Figure 36. If an agent does not 
consider ReceptionRate and trustworthiness (NoTR_n_NoRR), the agent may need to 
request the same set of information repeatedly without receiving responses, so the 
number of messages per timestep is low. On the other hand, if ReceptionRate is 
considered (RR), an agent requests information from the agents which seem to be the 
most willing to provide information, leading to higher number of messages per timestep 
to deal with. In summary, a strong collaborative relationship encourages active 
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Figure 40 Mean Square Errors versus Agent Configuration (ST3) 
Figure 39 and Figure 40 show the mean square errors (MSE) of the obtained 
information for different configurations of agents and different information request 
strategies. Similar to Figure 35 and Figure 37, MSE in ST2 (Figure 39) is not affected by 
the metrics for information request strategy decision. On the other hand, MSE without 
considering trustworthiness and ReceptionRate (NoTR_n_NoRR) is higher than the case 
where trustworthiness is considered for information request strategy (TR), as in Figure 
40. In summary, incorporating TR into expected reward helps agents select the 
information providers providing more accurate information elements.   
In the following experiment results (Exp 2.3), how CoCoAgents perform in the 
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Figure 41 Number of Final States Covered versus Maximum Timesteps (Adaptive DoC with Decay) 
Figure 41 shows the number of final states reached by each agent when an agent 
(agent 1) is selfish in a log scale graph. CoCoAgents (agent 0, agent 2, and agent 3) are 
equipped with the proposed strategies for an information consumer and information 
provider. Since agent 0 and agent 1 are completely complementary, they build a strong 
collaborative relationship and achieve active interactions satisfying each other’s deficit. 
Agent 2 does not have a completely complementary agent because agent 2 cannot receive 
any information from agent 1. Therefore, agent 2 tries to build a collaborative 
relationship with agent 0 and agent 3. However, since there is already a strong 
collaborative relationship between agent 0 and agent 3, agent 2 can be involved in fewer 
interactions by building weak collaborative relationships with agent 0 and agent 3. On the 
other hand, agent 1 is isolated from the interactions. Once CoCoAgents realize that an 
agent is selfish, they tend not to request information from the selfish agent and decay the 
degree of collaboration with the non-interacting agent. As a result, a selfish agent is 
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eventually isolated from the other agents. In Figure 41, agent 1’s number of final states 
stays constant near 60 although the maximum number of timesteps increases from 200 to 
1000, because agent 1 is isolated.       
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Figure 42 Number of Final States Covered versus Maximum Timesteps (Adaptive DoC with No 
Decay) 
If a CoCoAgent does not decay the degree of collaboration with non-interacting 
agents (Figure 42), the CoCoAgent is vulnerable to exploitation from other agents. From 
the figure, all agents equivalently achieve high number of final states even though agent 1 
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Figure 43 Number of Messages per Timestep versus Maximum Timesteps (Adaptive DoC with 
Decay) 
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Figure 44 Number of Messages per Timestep versus Maximum Timesteps (Adaptive DoC with No 
Decay) 
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Figure 43 shows the number of messages per timestep when the degree of 
collaboration with non-interacting agents is decayed over time. On the other hand, the 
degree of collaboration with non-interacting agents is not decayed in Figure 44. In Figure 
43, the number of messages per timestep of agent 0 and agent 3 stays near 4 (2 
information requests and 2 information supply) because they form a strong collaborative 
relationship. However, in Figure 44, agent 0 and agent 3’s numbers of messages per 
timestep are higher than agent 0 and agent 3’s numbers of messages per timestep for 
decaying the degree of collaboration with non-interacting agents as in Figure 43, meaning 
that agent 0 and agent 3 provide more information to other agents. Agent 2’s number of 
messages per timestep also increases if decaying the degree of collaboration is not 
deployed. This situation can be interpreted that a selfish agent (agent 1) is acquiring 
information without any contribution to other agents. Figure 45 and Figure 46 provide 
evidence for this phenomenon. Figure 45 shows the degree of collaboration when 
CoCoAgents decay the degree of collaboration with non-interacting agents, and Figure 46 
shows the degree of collaboration when the decaying scheme is not deployed. From the 
figures, if a decaying scheme is not deployed, agents are open to requests from selfish 
agents by keeping a high degree of collaboration with non-interacting agents. 
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Figure 45 Final Degree of Collaboration using Adaptive DoC with Decay in the presence of Selfish 
Agent 
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In this chapter, the experimental results are presented to answer the research 
questions in partner selection schemes and collaboration strategies among agents. The 
answers to the questions can be summarized as follows:  
In partner selection, 
 Information acquisition utility can be maximized by considering the coverage, 
cost and trustworthiness together. 
 Information quality can be increased by evaluating the trustworthiness of 
information providers and incorporating the evaluation into the selection 
criteria. 
 Information quality can be increased by allowing more bootstrapping time for 
building initial trustworthiness, while more bootstrapping time implies more 
computation time. 
 The proposed heuristic search techniques (HCSI: Hill-Climbing with Source 
Inversion, HCCI: Hill-Climbing with Complementary Inversion) aids agents 
in finding the combination of information providers who contribute more to 
the information acquisition utility by escaping from local optima or plateau in 
search operations.   
In collaboration strategies among agents, 
 CoCoAgents with proposed information sharing strategies tend to build strong 
collaborative relationships with completely complementary agents, and strong 
collaborative relationships help the efficient acquisition of required 
information. 
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 CoCoAgents can increase the efficiency of information requests, thus achieve 
the information acquisition more effectively by incorporating the models of 
other agents’ degree of collaboration into the expected rewards. 
 CoCoAgents can increase the quality of the acquired information by 
incorporating the trustworthiness evaluations of other agents into the expected 
rewards. 
 If a decaying scheme is not deployed, agents are open to requests from selfish 
agents by keeping a high degree of collaboration with non-interacting agents. 
 An adaptive degree of collaboration helps in building appropriate 
relationships with other agents and decaying the degree of collaboration with 





This dissertation presents information sharing strategies to maximize information 
acquisition utility and validate the following hypothesis: 
The information sharing strategies enable agents to obtain required information 
of high quality by building collaborative relationships with complementary and 
trustworthy agents.  
This chapter revisits the research questions and discusses the contributions of this 
research. 
 
6.1 REVISITING RESEARCH QUESTION 1 
“How do information consumer agents select the most appropriate 
information providers so that information acquisition utility can be 
maximized?”  
The first research question addresses the problem of partner selection. In partner 
selection, information providers always provide the requested information to the 
information requesters. However, the quality of information can vary from different 
information providers. The objective of the proposed partner selection scheme is to select 
the appropriate set of information providers who maximize the information acquisition 
utility. Information acquisition utility is defined in terms of coverage, trustworthiness, 
and cost. Given a set of information providers for information requirements, the coverage 
offered by respective information providers represents the percentage of information 
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requirements the respective provider can satisfy. Trustworthiness represents the accuracy 
and consistency of the information providers, modeled by the error distribution of the 
information provider using statistical methods. The cost of information acquisition can 
occur from various sources. The number of messages for information acquisition is used 
to represent the cost in this dissertation.  
When the objective of information consumer is to select a single information 
provider per information request, finding the optimal solution based on those evaluation 
metrics is tractable for a set of information requirements. However, if multiple 
information providers per information requirement can be selected, the computation 
complexity of finding the optimal solution increases exponentially as the number of 
available information providers and the number of requirements increases. The heuristic 
search techniques for finding the near-optimal solution given a limited amount of search 
time are presented. The proposed heuristic search techniques adopt the hill-climbing 
algorithm and genetic algorithm.  
The findings from the experimental results show the properties of the proposed 
algorithms as follows. Information acquisition utility can be maximized by considering 
the coverage, cost and trustworthiness together (Exp 1.1). If necessary information should 
be secured for goal achievement, the maximization of the information acquisition utility 
helps identify trustworthy information providers (Exp 1.2). The initial trust model 
significantly impacts on subsequent partner selection. An information consumer agent 
can build more accurate model of trustworthiness by gathering more evidence about the 
quality of the information. However, the tradeoff between the accuracy of the initial 
trustworthiness model and the amount of computation required for building the model 
needs to be considered by the system designer (Exp 1.3). The proposed heuristic search 
techniques (HCCI: Hill-Climbing with Complementary Inversion, HCSI: Hill-Climbing 
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with Source Inversion) using the measures of the information acquisition utility speed up 
finding more accurate information providers (Exp 1.4−Exp 1.7) given a limited amount 
of resources for computation. Using the characteristics of the search space, examining 
completely different combinations of information providers while performing a hill-
climbing search helps to escape from local optima or plateau (Exp 1.4-Exp 1.7). 
The uniqueness of this research starts from the definition of the goal-oriented 
information acquisition utility and partner selection from an individual agent’s 
perspective. By incorporating goal achievability into the information acquisition utility, 
agents can gather the required information proactively towards the goal achievement. 
Also, the goal-oriented information acquisition utility does not necessitate any additional 
payment or incentive systems, which are often required in other approaches (e.g., 
[Ioannidis, Ioannidis et al. 2002; Yu and Singh 2003b]) . An agent’s local decision using 
the evaluation of other agents allows the flexibility of selecting new partners in the 
presence of environmental dynamics. Moreover, HCCI (Hill-Climbing with 
Complementary Inversion) and HCSI (Hill-Climbing with Source Inversion) speed up the 
search by escaping the local optima or plateau quickly, and lead a consumer agent to 
“good-enough” partner selection swiftly with a limited amount of resources. The fast 
convergence to the “good-enough” partners also improves the information acquisition 
utility in dynamic environments. 
 
6.2 REVISITING RESEARCH QUESTION 2 
“How should an agent interact with other agents for sharing 
information?” 
The second research question addresses the problem of agents’ interactions, 
which can lead to the collaboration among agents in information sharing networks. In this 
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research question, self-interested agents can act as an information consumer and 
information provider at the same time. The objective of each agent is to maximize the 
information acquisition utility by constructing appropriate relationships with other agents. 
Agents equipped with information sharing strategies are called CoCoAgents (Competitive 
Collaborating Agents). The information sharing strategies for CoCoAgents consist of two 
types. The first strategy is for the information consumer’s role. The strategy for an 
information consumer decides from which information providers to request which 
information requirements. In order to take into account the previous interaction history 
and expected rewards in the future, stochastic games are deployed to represent the 
decision-making process. In the stochastic game models, the request strategy which 
maximizes the expected rewards is selected based on the actions of the information 
consumer agent and potential information provider agents. Expected rewards are 
calculated using the model of other agents’ degree of collaboration, the trustworthiness of 
the other agents, and the cost of information acquisition.  
The strategy for an information provider determines the degree of collaboration 
with other agents. The degree of collaboration is adapted using the model of other agents’ 
degree of collaboration, which can be built based on the observations of interactions with 
other agents. The adaptive degree of collaboration is a variation of Tit-For-Tat strategy 
from the Iterative Prisoner’s Dilemma problem [Axlerod 1984]. The action space for 
Tit-For-Tat is discrete (cooperate, defect) while the adaptive degree of collaboration 
considers continuous action space. Also, the adaptive degree of collaboration deals with 
the case where two agents do not make decisions simultaneously. The adaptive degree of 
collaboration starts from a high degree of collaboration with others. If an agent detects a 
decrease in other agents’ degree of collaboration, the agent decreases the degree of 
collaboration with those agents. If an agent detects an increase in other agents’ degrees of 
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collaboration, the agent increases the degree of collaboration with those agents. If an 
agent decides not to request information from particular agents (called non-interacting 
agents), the degree of collaboration with those non-interacting agents is decayed over 
time. The decay of the degree of collaboration with non-interacting agents aids in 
avoiding exploitation in the presence of selfish agents.  
The findings from the experimental results show the properties of the proposed 
algorithms as follows. An information request strategy enables agents to make 
information request decisions which lead to the acquisition of quality information from 
complementary and collaborative agents (Exp 2.1, Exp 2.2). Also, the adaptive degree of 
collaboration enables agents to encourage a more collaborative attitude toward 
collaborative agents. Moreover, decaying the degree of collaboration helps avoid 
potential exploitation by selfish agents (Exp 2.1, Exp 2.3). Finally, the information 
request and supply strategy triggered by the observed model of other agents contribute 
together to the bidirectional construction of the collaborative relationships (Exp 2.1, Exp 
2.2, Exp 2.3). 
The uniqueness of this research starts from the representation of the agents’ 
information sharing in stochastic games. The stochastic game model allows the 
incorporation of the other agents’ actions and the dynamic changes of the information 
requirements. Thus, an information consumer agent can find the best-responses to other 
information providers’ actions given the model of other agents’ expected actions. Also, 
the goal-oriented information acquisition utility, along with the information sharing 
strategies, provides a mechanism that encourages the emergence of collaborative 
relationships between complementary and trustworthy agents. Moreover, by providing 
the strategies for information providers and information consumers respectively, the 
proposed information sharing strategy can deal with the asynchronous information 
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exchange. As opposed to the explicit agreement-based collaboration schemes (e.g., 
[Shehory and Klaus 1995; Sandholm, Larson et al. 1998]), the emergent nature of the 
collaborative relationships allows the flexibility of constructing new relationships easily 
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